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ABSTRACT
INVESTOR REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF 
DISCRETIONARY LOSSES
In recent years, financial analysts, the 
financial press and others have directed criticism toward 
companies who have recogni2ed material discretionary 
losses in their income statements. The inference is that 
these firms are engaged in some form of deceptive report­
ing practice characterized by periodically "taking a 
financial bath." The expression "taking a financial bath" 
refers to a situation where management postpones the 
recognition of the financial effects of unfavorable 
events over several periods and then recognizes one large 
loss in the current period, thereby restricting any 
adverse investor reaction to that period. Research con­
cerning financial bath activity is not extensive; however, 
there are several studies which found a significant 
relationship between the recognition of discretionary 
losses and certain conditions existing within the firm.
The major objective of this study is to measure 
investor reaction to the announcement of a discretionary 
loss and to determine if a reaction can be influenced by 
timing the loss recognition in a period when certain
x
conditions are present. Relying upon the research in 
portfolio theory regarding the efficiency of the market 
in evaluating publicly available information, changes in 
security price returns were observed as a basis for 
assessing investors' reaction to the loss announcement.
The 60 firms analyzed in this study which were identified 
as having recognized a discretionary loss in the period 
extending from October, 1972, through September, 1973, 
were partitioned into six groups on the basis of the 
presence or absence of the test conditions. Attention 
was focused on the mean price residuals for all firms in 
the loss announcement week.
The results of this experiment indicate that the 
announcement of a discretionary loss is perceived by 
investors as an event of real economic significance as 
evidenced by a rapid investor response in terms of a 
significantly above-average price response in the week 
the discretionary loss is first publicly disclosed com­
pared to the mean price response experienced by the com­
panies in a six-month period prior to the loss announce­
ment. In addition, it was found that, on the average, the 
announcement of a discretionary loss is perceived by inves­
tors as "bad news" and elicits a significant downward 
security price adjustment in the week the loss is announced.
The final test performed in this study concerned 
whether or not the timing of the discretionary loss
xi
announcement in a period when certain conditions were 
present could influence investor response to the loss 
announcement. Statistical hypothesis for three condi­
tions were formulated: (1) an adverse income condition,
(2) depressed security price condition, and (3) an extra­
ordinary gain condition. For each of these conditions, 
the null hypothesis that there is no significant differ­
ence in investor reaction between those companies where 
the condition was present and those companies where the 
condition was not present could not be rejected at the 
.05 level of significance. On the basis of this evidence, 
it was concluded that investor reaction to the announce­
ment of a discretionary loss cannot be significantly 
influenced by timing the announcement in a period when any 
one of the test conditions is present.
The findings of this study are fully in accord with 
and lend support to the efficient market hypothesis. The 
announcement of a material discretionary loss was viewed 
by the market as news of an event with real economic sig­
nificance and elicited a significant investor reaction in 
the week the loss was announced. Investor reaction was 
rapid and negative. Practices such as timing the loss 
announcement when other conditions are present do not 
represent events of real economic significance and, hence, 
are ignored by the market.
xii
Chapter 1
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
AND RESEARCH PLAN
Income determination and its presentation in
financial statements continues to be a primary concern
of accountants and users of financial statements. The
Accounting Principles Board in Statement No. 4 states
that "the information presented in an income statement
is usually considered the most important information
provided by financial accounting because profitability
is a paramount concern to those interested in the
economic activities of the enterprise."^ Likewise, the
American Accounting Association in A Statement of Basic
Accounting Theory states that, "the past earnings of the
firm are considered to be the most important single item
of information relevant to the prediction of future 
2
earnings.”
^Accounting Principles Board (hereafter, APB), 
"Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying 
Financial Statements of Business Enterprises," Statement 
of the Accounting Principles Board No. 4 (New York! 
American institute of Certified Public~Xccountants [here­
after, AICPA], 1970), p. 7.
2
American Accounting Association, A Statement of 
Basic Accounting Theory (Evanston, Illinois! American 
Accounting Association, 1966), pp. 23-24.
1
In recent years, there has been increased concern
expressed over the quality and meaning of periodic income
3
figures being reported by some firms. Much of this con­
cern has been directed toward the seemingly growing prac­
tice of firms recognizing large charges to income which 
do not readily appear to be the result of identifiable 
events which have taken place in the current period. In 
many instances, these charges appear without the least 
forewarning and are of such magnitude that often several 
prior years' earnings are cancelled out. As a result, 
inferences as to the adequacy of prior years' reported 
income figures reflect some skepticism.
An empirical study by Copeland and Moore covering 
the period 1966 through 19 70 reports an upward trend in 
the number of companies reporting discretionary accounting
4
decisions which reduce income. A similar finding was 
reported in another empirical study by Charles Merz for
3
See, for example, Leopold A. Bernstein, "Reserve 
for Future Costs and Losses," Financial Analyst Journal, 
XXVI (January-February, 1970), 45-48; "The Year of the Big 
Bath," Forbes, March 1, 1971, pp. 42-4 3; Arlene Hershman, 
"Accounting: New Numbers, Same Game," Dunn1s Review,
August, 1972, pp. 38-41, 84; John H. Allan, "An fextra- 
ordinary Fog Envelops Accounting," The New York Times, 
January 14, 1973, sec. 3, p. 1, coll
4
Ronald M. Copeland and Michael L. Moore, "The 
Financial Bath: Is It Common?" MSU Business Topics, XX
(Autumn, 1972), 63-69.
5
the period 1967 through 1972. Data from recent issues of 
Accounting Trends and Techniques also reflect an upward 
trend in the number of companies reporting material charges 
in financial reports.
Table 1
Number of Companies Reporting Extraordinary 
Charges in Accounting Trends & Techniques
Number of Firms Reporting 
Extraordinary Charges 
in Income Statement
1973 216
1972 218
1971 206
1970 112
1969 100
1968 79
aEach issue reflects data of prior year.
Source:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
Accounting Trends & Techniques (New Yorki American Insti­
tute of Certified fcublic Accountants, published annually).
5
Charles M. Merz, "Extraordinary Losses Which Have 
Not Been Realized: Frequency of Occurrence Related to
Other Business Factors" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Southern California, 1974).
Year
An examination of the nature of the charges reveals 
that a majority of charges in each of the above years con­
cerned: (1) losses on the sale or other disposal of assets
and (2) losses on the disposal of discontinued operations. 
This upward trend may very well be the consequence of 
phenomenon observed by Paul Pacter several years ago:
The recent years have seen a marked increase 
in the number of business acquisitions in the rush 
toward agglomeration of corporate entities. This 
trend might well portend an increase in the number 
of situations in which segments of companies' 
operations are discontinued as uneconomical or 
otherwise unwanted acquisitions are disposed of 
by the management of the acquisitors.6
In order to remain viable, a business entity must 
be able to adjust rapidly to changed economic conditions. 
Economic change often requires a company to alter its 
activities significantly. The problems and difficulties 
encountered in the process of adjustment are often accom­
panied by new and unforeseen problems in the accounting 
and reporting of these new activities. The economic 
environment in the 1960's nurtured a significant increase 
in the number of mergers and acquisitions along with 
serious accounting and reporting problems. The APB con­
sidered these accounting problems to be of such magnitude 
that it was necessary to issue APB Opinion No. 16 and APB 
Opinion No. 17 in an attempt to alter accounting practice
6Paul A. Pacter, "Reporting Discontinued Opera­
tions," The Journal of Accountancy, CXXVIII (November, 
1969), 6iT
7
to bettor reflect the changed economic environment. The 
economic environment in the 1970’s may very well be a 
period of re-evaluation and disposition as firms seek to 
adjust to a constantly changing environment. Accountants 
should be alert to significant changes in the pattern of 
corporate reporting and should closely scrutinize areas 
which heretofore may not have caused concern, but now, 
because of a changed economic environment, might be devel­
oping into a serious accounting and reporting problem.
A number of accountants and financial observers 
view the upward trend in the number of companies reporting 
large charges to income as a condition which is fostering 
undesirable accounting practices and, in some instances, 
misleading reports.
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
In 1965, Leopold Bernstein conducted an empirical 
study on the manner in which extraordinary gains and
g
losses are presented in corporate annual reports. This 
study documented a considerable number of inconsistencies 
in the manner in which items of a similar nature were being 
presented in annual reports. There appeared to be a
7
APB, "Business Combinations," APB Opinion No. 16 
(New Yorks AICPA, 1970); APB, "Intangible Assets,* APB 
Opinion No. 17 (New York: AICPA, 1970).
g
Leopold A. Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary 
Gains and Losses (New Yorks Ronald Press Co., lt»67) .
tendency for gains to appear in the income statement
whereas large losses were taken directly to the balance
9
sheet through retained earnings. Conceptually, justifi­
cation for these inconsistent treatments often found thei 
basis in the differing viewpoints of those who advocated 
the All-Inclusive Concept versus those who supported the 
Current Operating Performance Concept of income determina 
tion. With the issuance of Opinion No. 9, the APB sought 
to reduce the inconsistencies in practice and to specify 
which items should be included in the determination of 
i n c o m e . T h e  Opinion was successful in obtaining some 
uniformity in the statement presentation of items in the 
determination of income. It also created a separate 
category for extraordinary items on the income statement 
and defined the criteria to be used in recognizing items 
in this category. Unfortunately, reporting abuses 
observed in subsequent years demonstrated that the cri­
teria established for extraordinary items contained weak­
nesses and appeared to be subject to opportunistic 
interpretation by some reporting firms.
Several studies conducted subsequent to the 
issuance of APB Opinion No. 9 identified several areas
g
Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary . . .,
p. 182.
■^®APB, "Reporting the Results of Operations," APB 
Opinion No. 9 (New York: AICPA, 1966).
where inconsistencies and questionable practices concerning 
extraordinary items were evolving. In one study, Michael 
Amenta found inconsistencies among firms in the manner in 
which they classified similar items.1'1 Some firms classi­
fied certain types of events as extraordinary whereas the 
same type of event was classified as ordinary by other 
firms. Perhaps the most serious of the observed practices
concerned the use of the extraordinary category as sort of
12a "second class" income classification. That is, when 
operations were favorable, results were deemed to be normal 
recurring operating income; however, when results proved 
unfavorable the items were categorized as being extra­
ordinary. This impression was often further reinforced by 
management’s explanations and releases to the financial 
press, thereby leading one to the belief that the loss 
items were not the result of normal operations; they were 
unusual and beyond the control of management and hence 
should not be considered in an evaluation of operations 
or the performance of management.
^Michael J. Amenta, "Unsettled Issues and Mis­
applications of APB Opinion No. 9 as to Treatment of Extra­
ordinary Items," The CPA Journal, XL1I (August, 1972), 640- 
43, 664.
12C. B. Hellerson, "Treatment of Extra-Ordinary 
Items in the Financial Statements," California State Uni- 
versity. Sacramento Fourth Annual Accounting Symposium, 
ed. Bagar A. feaidi (Sacramento, California: center for 
Research and Management Services, School of Business and 
Public Administration, November IS, 1972), pp. 26-46.
Of equal interest was the large magnitude of some 
of the charges and the curious pattern of their appearance 
in the financial statements suggesting that a definite 
timing in the reporting of these events might have occurred. 
The state of the economy in 1970 seemed to provide an 
environment which magnified the big write-off and extra­
ordinary charge phenomenon. Loss discoveries soared to
such an extent that 1970 was dubbed "The Year of the Big 
13Bath." A financial bath is generally characterized as 
a "clearing the decks process"; that is, a clean-up of 
balance sheet accounts by write-off or write-down often 
accompanied by making a provision for future costs and 
expenses.
A number of accountants, financial analysts, and 
the financial press began posing the question whether or 
not this financial bath phenomenon might not be an income 
manipulation device whereby management was attempting to 
smooth or shift income from one period to another. Con­
sidering the magnitude of some of the write-offs, the 
question that presented itself was why some of these sub­
stantial losses were not discernible or at least disclosed 
as a possibility in prior years. The informal remarks of 
executives and analysts shed more light on this curiosity 
them the official explanations given in annual reports.
13"The Year of the Big Bath," Forbes.
9An executive of a New York brokerage firm analyzed the 
large number of write-offs in this way:
It was a lousy year anyway, and there's a 
general tendency to write off everything but 
the kitchen sink in such a year. For some 
firms, . . . write-offs in 1970 are going to 
jazz up 1971 results.14
A financial vice-president of one company was quoted as
follows:
We had one single big write-off we decided 
that we should take. Once we decided on that, 
we tended to throw some other stuff in with it.
I don't expect all the write-offs we took will 
stand up under Internal Revenue Service scrutiny.
But even if we have to go back and reverse it 
sometime later, it can't do anything but help 
out shareholders.15
Another observer offers the following explanation:
In their zeal to achieve earnings growth, 
corporations have often postponed public 
recognition of unprofitable situations. When 
the problems become so bad that they can't be 
hidden any more, they are cut away in a drastic 
effort executives invariably characterize as 
“extraordinary.
From an investor standpoint, one might well 
question the significance of conclusions drawn from an 
analysis of earnings or the trend in earnings in situations 
where management can seemingly exercise such broad discre­
tion in the reporting of losses. From an accounting
14Jim Hyatt, “Clearing the Books," The Wall Street 
Journal, March 25, 1971, p. 1, col. 6.
15"The Year of the Big Bath," Forbes, p. 43.
^®Allan, "An Extraordinary Fog . . p. 7,
col. 1.
10
standpoint, one might also question the adequacy of the 
criteria which guides loss recognition. Is the criteria 
so flexible that management is able to control the timing 
of these items?
A search of the accounting literature reveals a 
surprising lack of discussion of the conceptual nature of 
a loss and how it fits into the contemporary accounting 
framework. The accounting literature abounds in the dis­
cussion of revenues and expenses with criteria for recog­
nition specifically identified in official pronouncements. 
Conversely, there is a definite void in the literature 
concerning losses and the guidance offered is in the form 
of a recommendation that losses be recognized in the period 
they are suffered or ascertained. In this regard, Devine's 
comment seems pertinent— that the recommendation ". . .is 
no doubt good advice, but it remains non-operational until
the criteria for 'suffered* and the necessary support for
17'ascertained* are specified." There is mounting evidence 
that the recommendation is being subjected to opportunistic 
interpretation.
Another aspect of the problem which should be of 
interest to accountants in general, and investors and
17Carl Thomas Devine, "Loss Recognition," Account­
ing Research, VI (October, 1955), 310-20, as reprinted in 
Sidney Davidson et al.. An Income Approach to Accounting 
Theoryt Readings and Questions (Englewood dliffs. New 
Jerseys Prentice-Hail, Inc., 1*964), p. 166.
11
other users of financial statements in particular, is the 
possible use of the financial bath as a means of manipu­
lating reported earnings in such a way as to influence the 
impact of a material charge to income. There have been a 
number of allegations in the financial press that manage­
ment attempts to postpone the recognition of material 
unfavorable events until a period perceived as convenient. 
Ostensibly, the objective is an attempt to minimize an 
expected adverse investor reaction to the unfavorable news. 
Presumably, an adverse investor reaction can be influenced 
by recognition of the unfavorable news in a period when 
certain conditions are present. These allegations and per­
ceived conditions will be reviewed and evaluated in a sub­
sequent chapter. However, if these allegations are valid, 
the implication is that management is engaged in a form of 
income manipulation for the purpose of influencing investor 
reaction. Since this alleged activity is implemented 
through the medium of accounting financial reports, serious 
questions can be raised about the propriety of accounting 
practices employed and whether they fall within the 
sanctions of generally accepted accounting principles.
OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY
The increased frequency with which material charges 
have appeared in corporate reports, the magnitude of the 
reported amounts, the fact that the financial press and the
12
SEC imply that many of these substantial write-offs have 
taken the investment community by surprise, appear to be 
sufficient circumstantial conditions that warrant the con­
cern of the accounting profession. One would expect that 
with the presence of the above conditions, the nature of 
these events and the criteria for their recognition would 
be well-established by accounting theory. Yet a review of 
the literature reveals that this is not the case.
One objective of this study is to develop the 
conceptual nature of an accounting loss and criteria neces­
sary for its recognition, valuation and classification 
under generally accepted accounting principles. This 
objective is a prerequisite to an analysis of any weak­
nesses or inadequacies in existing guidelines. In addition, 
it also serves as a basis for assessing the feasibility of 
alleged abuses that many have ascribed to this area of 
financial reporting.
Another major objective of this study was to 
empirically test whether the alleged effects ascribed to 
firms which implement a financial bath actually occur. A 
financial bath is implemented by the recognition of a large 
material charge to income in the current period under cir­
cumstances which suggest that management had timed the 
release of the unfavorable news. Specifically, tests 
utilizing changes in security prices are developed which 
measure whether investors react to the announcement that a
13
material loss is to be recognized. In addition the 
direction of investor response was determined. A final 
aspect of financial bath activity that was tested is 
whether any observed investor reaction was significantly 
influenced by timing the recognition of losses in a period 
when certain conditions were present.
Other studies to be reviewed later in this paper 
conclude that firms do take financial baths, that it is 
an increasing financial reporting phenomenon, and that 
there are certain conditions under which a firm is more 
likely to implement a financial bath than others. This 
study is an extension of this research and explores the 
rationale or motivation for implementing a financial bath 
along with an identification of management's perception 
of the benefits or effects to be derived from its imple­
mentation. Finally, whether or not these perceived bene­
fits or effects are actually realized are ascertained.
RESEARCH ORGANIZATION AND 
METHODOLOGICAL PLAN
The first phase of this study focuses on establish­
ing the conceptual nature of an accounting loss. Chapter 2 
includes a thorough search of the accounting literature in 
order to develop the theory of loss identification and 
recognition under generally accepted accounting principles. 
Particular attention was directed toward the publications 
of recognized accounting authorities such as accounting
14
and financial professional organizations, governmental 
agencies, and the works of noted scholars in the field of 
accountancy. Following this, an analysis was made which 
attempted to develop the concept of a loss as a separate 
and distinct element in the accounting framework. Finally, 
a discussion of the operational aspects of the recognition, 
valuation and classification of losses was presented.
Chapter 3 was devoted to developing the rationale 
or motivation which appears to be the basis for the report­
ing phenomenon known as a financial bath. The financial 
literature was searched for references to financial bath 
activities and the implied consequences of such activity 
was noted and analyzed. Since a financial bath is imple­
mented through loss recognition, an evaluation was made 
whether the concept of an accounting loss as developed in 
Chapter 2 is compatible with the alleged effects ascribed 
to financial bath activity. In other words, does financial 
bath activity fall within the limits of contemporary 
accounting practice as reflected by generally accepted 
accounting principles? In addition, prior research studies 
into the bath phenomenon are reported and evaluated. The 
conclusions reported in these studies provide important 
inputs for the tests undertaken in this study.
The major hypotheses of this study are formulated 
in Chapter 4. This study relied on a substantial body of 
research developed in portfolio theory concerning the
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efficiency of capital markets. Specifically, security 
price returns were observed in order to assess investors' 
reaction to the announcement of a material discretionary 
loss. Several hypotheses were developed to test whether 
or not investors do react, whether a reaction is signifi­
cantly unfavorable, and if a reaction was modified by 
timing the release of the loss announcement in a period 
when certain conditions are present. This study employed 
a form of the two-parameter, risk-return investment model. 
Commonly referred to as the Markowitz-Sharpe-Lintner sim­
plified market-model, it linearly relates the return on 
individual securities to a market return <PRmt) as
reflected in a market index. This model is explained and 
defined in Chapter 4 along with the statistical tests 
employed. Finally, prior research which is relevant to 
this study are reported and evaluated.
The results of the experiment are reported in 
Chapter 5. Evidence gathered in the study along with the 
statistics from the statistical tests employed are used 
as a basis for accepting or rejecting the major hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 4. Characteristics of the experiment 
and sample companies were noted in order to give a clear 
perspective to an interpretation of results. The chapter's 
conclusion summarizes the major findings along with an 
interpretation and assessment of their implications.
16
A recapitulation of the study is presented in 
Chapter 6 which includes a summary of the major findings, 
an interpretation of their significance, and recommenda­
tions for future extensions of research in this area.
CONTRIBUTIONS OP THIS STUDY
The term "loss" is used extensively in the field 
of accountancy, yet a lucid delineation of its conceptual 
nature is clearly lacking. In discussing losses as a 
fundamental activity that should be evaluated, Bedford 
concludes that: "In general, the recognition of losses is
one of the areas in which accounting research is badly
18needed." This study attempts to direct attention to an 
important element in the accounting framework and contrib­
utes to a better understanding of its significance as a 
surrogate for underlying events and relationships.
In recent years, financial analysts, the financial 
press and others have directed criticism toward companies 
who have recognized large material charges to income. The 
inference is that these firms are engaged in some form of 
deceptive reporting practice characterized by periodically 
taking a financial bath. This study contributes to a 
better understanding of the financial bath phenomenon and
18Norton M. Bedford, Income Determination Theory:
An Accounting Framework (Reading, rtass.2 Addison-Wesley, 
1965V;~p. 174.----------
its alleged impact on investor reaction. The findings of 
this study have complementary implications for the fields 
of accounting and finance. As primary users of accounting 
data, investors can be aided in their investment decisions 
by improvements in the accounting presentation of economic 
events. Likewise, the prestige and importance of accoun­
tants will be enhanced if the users of its product find it 
useful and necessary in their decision-making processes.
Chapter 2
THE NATURE OF AN ACCOUNTING LOSS 
UNDER GENERALLY ACCEPTED 
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
An important function of accounting is to
communicate information about the economic events of an
entity that will be useful in making economic decisions.1
In fulfilling the communication function, accounting
utilizes a set of symbols which are representations of
the economic events of the entity. In other words,
accounting symbols are surrogates of the events for which
2
economic decision makers have an interest. Successful 
communication with users of accounting information depends 
on, among other things, a clear understanding of the 
accounting symbols used and how well the symbols discrimi­
nate underlying events of interest. The objective of this 
chapter is to examine the nature of the accounting symbol 
"loss" which is used extensively in the accounting
1Study Group on the Objectives of Financial State­
ments, Objectives of Financial Statements {New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973), 
p. 13.
2
Yuji Ijiri, The Foundations of Accounting Measure- 
ment (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey^ Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
r w m ,  p. 6.
18
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literature and appears frequently in financial accounting 
statements.
If the frequency with which a term is used in 
communication is an indication of general agreement as to 
the objects and events represented by the term, then the 
accounting symbol "loss" should be clearly delineated in 
the accounting literature. Vet a clear enunciation of the 
conceptual nature of a loss is lacking in the official 
pronouncements of authoritative bodies and in the account­
ing literature in general. Even in those instances where 
the term "loss" is identified, one finds inconsistencies 
in its usage and an overlapping with other accounting terms. 
The analysis to follow will point out some of these incon­
sistencies and attempt to identify the constitutive nature 
of a loss as it is used in financial accounting. The con­
ceptual nature of a loss will then be related to the opera­
tional procedures of its measurement, recognition and 
classification.
IDENTIFICATION OF LOSS REFERENTS 
IN THE ACCOUNTING LITERATURE
Communication of information about a multitude of 
activities and objects by the use of symbols requires a 
precise delineation of the referents of the symbols. In 
reviewing the accounting literature it soon becomes appar­
ent that the term "loss" is not identified with a speci­
ficity that would preclude confusion as to the referents.
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Some have defined losses in terms of how it is
measured; others have identified it by its effect on
owner's equity, and still others see it as synonymous with
the accounting symbol "expense."
In the Paton and Littleton monograph, loss is
identified . . as an expiration of costs incurred v-ith-
3
out compensation or return. . . . "  Similarly, an American
Accounting Association Committee has defined loss as ". . .
expired cost not beneficial to the revenue producing activi-
4
ties of the enterprise." To identify losses as "expired 
cost" focuses attention on measurement and its expression 
in the standard unit of measure used in accounting. The 
number of dollars (the expired cost) is the manner in which 
accountants measure the activity; it is not a description 
of the event or activity itself. Consequently, those 
definitions which identify a loss as an "expired cost" are 
focusing on the measurement of an event rather than on the 
nature of the event which caused the measurement to be made. 
The referent of the symbol "loss" becomes the dollar measure­
ment of the activity rather than the event itself.
^W. A. Paton and A. C. Littleton, An Introduction to 
Corporate Accounting Standards (American Accounting Associa­
tion, m d ) T p “ 9 J T --------------
4
Committee on Accounting Concepts and Standards, 
Accounting and Reporting Standards for Corporate Financial 
Statements and Preceding Statements and Supplements 
(American Accounting Association, 1957), p. 6.
21
Another source of confusion is whether the symbol 
"loss" is a separate identifiable concept in and of itself 
or whether it is a sub-classification of some other concept. 
Sprouse and Moonitz appear to identify losses as a separate 
and distinct concept. They define losses as ". . . de­
creases in net assets, other than (a) those resulting from 
distributions to owners or (b) those resulting from ex­
penses."^ This definition conveys two important points. 
First, a loss is identified as a net concept and is stated 
in terms of asset decrements. Second, it clearly implies 
that losses are a separate element distinguishable from 
distributions to owners and expenses.
Contrast this conception of a loss with that 
espoused in APB Statement No. 4.
Losses are sometimes defined in the account­
ing literature as expired costs that produce no 
revenues. "Losses" of that type are a subclassi­
fication of expenses in this Statement. *> (My 
emphasis.)
If an object is identified as being a part of a 
larger class of items, then the former should possess the
5
Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, "A Tenta­
tive Set of Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enter­
prises," Accounting Research Study No. 3 (New Yorki Ameri­
can Institute o4T Certified Public Accountants, 1962), 
p. 50.
6Accounting Principles Board, "Basic Concepts and 
Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of 
Business Enterprises," Statement of the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board No. 4 (New York: American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, 1970), fn. 54, p. 95.
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characteristics of the larger class. Expense is then 
defined as:
. . . gross decreases in assets or gross 
increases in liabilities recognized and meas­
ured in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles that result from those 
types of profit-directed activities of an 
enterprise that can change owners' equity.7
Profit-directed activities are defined as all enterprise 
activities except those that involve transfers with enter­
prise owners. Therefore, both the Sprouse and Moonitz 
study and APB Statement No. 4 delineate between a loss and 
a distribution or transfer to enterprise owners. However, 
whereas the former envisions a loss as a net decrease in 
assets and conceptually separate from expense, the latter 
views losses as a gross concept and as a subclassification 
of expense.
To illustrate the difference in point of view, 
assume that an investment in securities is made for $1,000 
at the beginning of a period and sold for $750 at the end 
of the period. Under the Sprouse and Moonitz conception, 
a loss of $250 results as the net of a $750 increase in the 
asset Cash and a $1,000 decrease in the asset Investment. 
Under the APB Statement No. 4 interpretation, an expense of 
$1,000 would be recorded as the result of a gross decrease 
in the asset Investment. In Chapter 1 of Statement No. 4,
7"Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles," 
pp. 51-52.
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it was stated that the Statement was primarily descriptive 
rather than prescriptive and that the ideas expressed for
o
the most part were already accepted. The Sprouse and 
Moonitz study, on the other hand, was more or less norma­
tive in nature. Yet contemporary accounting practice 
appears to view losses in the same light as Sprouse and
Moonitz--that is, a net concept separate and distinct from
9
the concept of an expense.
The viewpoint expressed in APB Statement No. 4 is 
a departure from the definition that appeared in Accounting 
Terminology Bulletin No. 4 where loss was defined as:
(1) the excess of all expenses, in the broad 
sense of that word, over revenues for a period, 
or
(2) the excess of all or the appropriate 
portion of all the cost of assets over related 
proceeds, if any, when the items are sold,
abandoned or either wholly or partially de­
stroyed by casualty or otherwise written off.^-0
This definition of loss embraces a net concept—  
but at two different levels of aggregation. In the first
instance, loss is defined as a residual: the result of
subtracting the total of all expenses recognized from the
o
"Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles," p. 2.
g
This conclusion is based on the manner in which 
losses are reported in the published annual reports used 
in this study.
^American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
Accounting Research and Terminology Bulletins. Final Edition 
7New York: AICPA, 1961), p. 42 of "Accounting Terminology
Bulletins."
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total of all revenues recognized during the period.
Defined in this manner, a loss is a separate and distinct 
concept and in no way could be considered a subclassifi­
cation of expense.
In the second instance, loss is defined on an 
individual basis as the residual that results from sub­
tracting the cost from the proceeds involved in a single 
transaction. It is interesting to note that loss is 
defined in terms of costs and proceeds. In other Ter­
minology Bulletins, the Committee carefully pointed out 
that revenues and proceeds were not synonymous and likewise 
costs and expenses were not one and the same.^
The continued indiscriminate use of the symbol loss 
is further evidenced by a recent Standard of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. In Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 5— Accounting for Contingencies, 
it was necessary to clarify the use of the term as follows:
The term loss is used for convenience to 
include many charges against income that are 
commonly referred to as expenses and others 
that are commonly referred to as losses.I2
11AICPA, "Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 2," 
pp. 3 3-34, and AICPA, "Accounting Terminology Bulletin 
No. 4," pp. 41-42.
12Financial Accounting Standards Board (hereafter, 
FASB), "Accounting for Contingencies," Statement of Finan- 
cial Accounting Standards No. 5 (Stamford. Conn.: FASB,
1775), in* r,'p. 1.-----------
In other words, the Board acknowledges that some of the 
charges that the Statement addresses are commonly referred 
to as expenses while other charges of interest are 
commonly referred to as losses; but In the Statement both 
types are identified as losses. Consequently, one is given 
the impression that those charges commonly referred to as 
expenses can be conveniently considered a sub-classifica­
tion of the broader concept "loss." A labor-saving device 
is desirable in many instances, but a pronouncement by an 
authoritative body on accounting matters should not sacri­
fice the clarity of the meaning of accounting symbols for 
the sake of convenience in exposition.
The above references to losses are typical of 
those found in the accounting literature and illustrate the 
confusion and sometimes contradictory conception of the 
accounting symbol "loss.” The imprecise delineation of an 
important and often used symbol in a discipline which seeks 
to communicate economic information by the use of symbols 
can be a detriment to the usefulness and hence the desir­
ability of accounting data. Careless use of a symbol in 
inappropriate situations can only serve to confuse recipi­
ents of the communication and propagate a further misuse of 
terms.
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THE NATURE OF A LOSS
The word "loss" is in common usage in the English 
language. It has been defined as:
13(1) a decrease in amount, magnitude, or degree.
{2) a being deprived of or coming to be without
something that one has had.
(3) a detriment or disadvantage from failure to
keep, have, or get. 14
These generalized definitions all imply diminution, dis­
appearance, or reduction in some quantity or quality that 
previously existed or could have been obtained. A loss can 
be interpreted as the action or process of diminishment.
A decrease in amount, magnitude, or degree is a 
completely neutral definition of loss. It neither implies 
a favorable nor unfavorable consequence nor the cause or 
object of diminution. Consequently, if the symbol is to 
communicate information effectively, it must be related to 
other ideas and concepts. In other words, it must have 
greater specificity.
Because man tends to be an acquisitive being, the 
symbol loss often connotes an undesirable or unfavorable 
situation. Those definitions which contain words such as 
deprivation, detriment, and disadvantage have a greater 
degree of specificity in that they imply that whatever
13Webster’s New Collegiat e Dictionary (Springfield, 
Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company, 19?4).
14C. L. Barnhardt, ed., The American College 
Dictionary (New York: Random House', 1^67) .
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object or quality that was lost, was valued or was 
desired. In addition, there is the implication that as a 
minimum objective, the desirable or sought after conse­
quence is to at least preserve or maintain. Failure to do 
so is to one's detriment or disadvantage.
Symbols have meaning in a particular context; when 
the situation changes, the information conveyed by a symbol 
often changes. It was noted previously that the symbol 
"loss'' in most contexts implies an unfavorable condition 
because something that was valued was not maintained. But
if the object or quality lost was not valued or was undesir­
able to begin with, then its diminution would not be to 
one's disadvantage or detriment. Therefore, in order to 
appreciate the communicative significance of a symbol, it 
is necessary to study the context in which the symbol is 
being used.
LOSS REFERENT IN FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
In an accounting context, the term "loss" conforms
to its generalized meaning; that is, it implies a decrease 
or disappearance of some object or quality. But in order 
to understand the information conveyed by the accounting 
symbol loss, it must be given greater specificity by 
identifying the object of diminishment.
Financial accounting is concerned with providing 
information about the economic activities of an entity.
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Economic activity in the United States involves the
production and distribution of goods and services by
acquiring, using, and distributing economic resources.
Consequently, financial accounting primarily reports on
the stock of economic resources at a particular time and
changes in the stock over time intervals.
Since the enterprise utilizes resources from
sources other than that provided by the owners, accounting
is also concerned with the equity interest of all parties
who provide economic resources for the entity. This may be
expressed in equation form as:
Enterprise economic * Equity in Enterprise
resources economic resources
Expanding the equity interest, the equation becomes
Enterprise Equity in the enterprise Owners' equity in 
economic - economic resources other + enterprise eco- 
resources than by owners nomic resources
And more conventionally,
Assets =* Liabilities + Owners' Equity 
Assets then is the accounting symbol whose referents are 
all the various heterogeneous economic resources an entity 
may have at a particular time. Likewise, Liabilities and
Owners' Equity are the accounting symbols which represent
the equity interest in the enterprise resources. Account­
ing conveys this information through the medium of a finan­
cial report variously referred to as the Balance Sheet, 
Statement of Financial Condition or Statement of Financial
Position. Operationally an enterprise is engaged in 
continuous activity; consequently, the stock of economic 
resources and the equity in them is not static. Changes 
are the result of a multitude of factors, some of which 
are deliberate, voluntary and fortuitous while others are 
accidental, involuntary and unfavorable. Accounting com­
municates information about these changes through various 
financial reports such as Comparative Balance Sheets, A 
Statement in Changes in Financial Position, A Statement of 
Changes in Owners’ Equity, A Statement of Changes in Re­
tained Earnings, and an Income Statement being the most 
common. All these reports are designed to convey informa­
tion as to the cause of changes in economic resources over 
a period of time as a result of operations.
If we accept the premise that business activity 
consists of the acquisition, utilization and disposition 
of economic resources and that financial accounting is 
concerned with communicating information about enterprise 
business activities, it follows that the concept of an 
economic resource is the focal point in financial account­
ing. All accounting symbols which seek to describe the 
stock of enterprise economic resources and changes in them 
are interrelated and are derived from this basic concept.
If a loss describes a process of diminution or disappearance 
of some object or quality in general, then specifically in 
a financial accounting context, the objects of diminishment
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are the economic resources under the stewardship of the 
entity. It follows that the nature of an accounting loss 
can be derived and operationally defined from an analysis 
of the nature of enterprise asset decrements.
ENTERPRISE ASSET DECREMENTS
The stock of enterprise economic resources may 
decrease as a result of returning resources to those who 
have a legal equity interest in the resources of the 
entity. Some examples in conventional practice would be 
when the enterprise utilizes cash or other resources to 
satisfy liability claims such as: accounts and notes pay­
able, interest and wages payable, bonds and mortgages due. 
Economic resources such as cash or other assets may also 
be returned to stockholders in the form of cash or property 
dividends. Conventional accounting practice does not view 
the reduction of resources of this type as losses but 
rather as a transfer or a distribution of resources to 
those who have a claim to those resources in accordance with 
the legal rights inherent in the contracts with the entity. 
In a technical sense, there has been no diminishment or 
disappearance of resources. The resources and their 
capacity to satisfy wants are still intact; they only have 
been transferred from the realm of stewardship, responsi­
bility and accountability of the entity.
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Individually, any one resource may decline only to 
be offset by an increase of equal magnitude in any one of 
a number of other resources. In the aggregate, however, 
total resources under the stewardship of the entity have 
not diminished, only the composition has changed. From 
the accounting viewpoint, this type of occurrence is not a 
loss but rather an exchange. There are numerous examples 
in practice: cash is exchanged for supplies, inventory
items, equipment, patents, etc.; accounts and notes re­
ceivable, investments are exchanged for cash. Individual 
resources are often combined, the objective being to create 
new resources which have at a minimum the same capacity to 
satisfy wants as the individual resources had that were 
used in combination. To the extent this is accomplished, 
there is no diminution of total resources under the 
stewardship of the entity.
The process of acquisition, combination or utiliza­
tion and finally the exchange of economic resources is the 
essence of business activity. In a free-enterprise capital­
istic system, the incentive to commit resources in an effort 
to produce goods and services which satisfy wants is the 
opportunity to enhance the owners1 equity in economic 
resources over and above the amount originally committed.
In a business venture, the objective of acquiring, com­
bining, and utilizing economic resources is to create time, 
place, or form utility which can be exchanged for economic
resources greater than those expended in the effort. To 
the extent the enterprise is successful in this effort, 
those economic resources generated in exchange over and 
above those expended are the rewards of business activity, 
and cause an increase in the owners' equity in economic 
resources under the stewardship of the entity. In finan­
cial accounting, the symbol "income" is used to represent 
the increase in enterprise economic resources that accrue 
to the owners because of successful business activity.
Analagous to the opportunity for economic resource 
enhancement as the incentive to engage in business activity 
and "income" as the reward representing successful accom­
plishment, there are also associated risks. Engaging in 
business activity involves the risk that economic resources 
will be expended or disappear without creating utility 
equal to the economic resources diminished in the effort. 
Such an occurrence may be referred to as unsuccessful 
business activity or lack of accomplishment. The conse­
quence of such an occurrence is a diminution in enterprise 
economic resources which in turn causes a contraction of 
the owners' equity in enterprise resources. It is in this 
context that the accounting symbol "loss" derives its mean­
ing and separate identity from other accounting symbols.
In financial accounting, the surrogate "loss" represents 
the diminution in enterprise resources that accrue to the 
owners because of unsuccessful business activity. It is
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the antithesis of the symbol income. In a capitalistic 
system, it is the penalty borne by those who commit 
economic resources to an enterprise for business activity 
and that entity is not successful in maintaining the 
aggregate of resources committed to its stewardship.
NATURE OF AN ACCOUNTING LOSS
From the foregoing analysis, a loss in a financial 
accounting context may be defined as:
A diminution or disappearance of enterprise 
economic resources which is the result of un­
successful business activity. The circumstances 
under which this occurrence takes place is when 
enterprise economic resources are expended or 
disappear without creating an equivalent 
utility.
Thus far, the nature of an accounting loss has been 
described in terms of its constitutive meaning. No refer­
ence has been made as to how the loss is measured or the 
operations necessary to establish the existence of a loss. 
This was intentional because the nature of an event or 
action should be separately distinguishable from the manner 
in which it is measured. Yet, if a term is to have maxi­
mum communicative capacity, the operations necessary to 
establish its existence and the manner in which it is 
measured along with its constitutive meaning must be iden­
tified in order to develop a precise meaning of the term 
in a financial accounting context. This process is known
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15as giving operational content to a concept.
Although an accounting loss is constitutively 
concerned with economic resources, it also has a qualita­
tive interpretation that implies that an assessment has 
been made of each event or action that affected an enter­
prise resource. These events or actions may have been 
initiated by or within the entity itself, or its origin 
may have come externally from other entities or the 
environment in which the enterprise operates.
Financial accounting reflects this assessment on 
a periodic basis by using the following model:
Revenues - Expenses = Net Income (or Loss)
Income was previously identified as the increase in enter­
prise economic resources accruing to owners as a result of 
successful business activity. Its antithesis, loss, was 
identified as the decrease in enterprise resources that 
accrue to the owners as a result of unsuccessful business 
activity. The qualifying term net, which precedes income 
or loss in the accounting model, implies a final result; 
that is, the residual of the total of successful and 
unsuccessful activities. Operationally then, a loss comes 
into being by subtracting expenses from revenues with the 
former being greater than the latter.
^Norton M. Bedford, Extensions in Accounting Dis­
closure (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1973), p. 26.
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The operation in and of itself is clear, yet the 
conventional view of revenues and expenses is not con­
sistent with the end result as defined in the model.
Since both revenues and expenses seek to explain changes 
in the stock of economic resources, they too find their 
constitutive meanings in the form of economic resources.
Historically, the association between expense and 
revenues has been based upon a cause and effect relation­
ship.1® That is, expenses are viewed as the economic 
resources under the stewardship of the entity which are 
utilized individually or in combination in an effort to 
create time, place or form utility. For example, Sprouse 
and Moonitz define expense as:
. . . the decrease in net assets as a 
result of the use of economic services in 
the creation of revenues or of the imposi­
tion of taxes by governmental units.lv
Similarly, Bedford views expenses as ”. . . the cost of
18the services used up to provide the recognized revenues," 
And finally and perhaps more completely, Hendriksen defines 
expenses as:
16Paton and Littleton, pp. 14-18.
17Sprouse and Moonitz, p. 9.
18Norton M. Bedford, Income Determination Theory:
An Accounting Framework (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesiey,
i m ), p. 172.---------
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. . . the using or consuming of goods and 
services in the process of obtaining revenues.
They are the expirations of factor services 
related either directly or indirectly to the 
producing and selling of the product of the 
enterprise.
These particular interpretations of the nature of 
an expense are quite representative of the expositions on 
expenses that appear in the accounting literature. All 
reflect the view that expense represents the process of 
resource utilization in order to create a product or ser­
vice which can be exchanged for resources (revenues) at 
least equal to those expended.
Revenues have been viewed as the economic resources
received in exchange for the efforts expended. In other
words, revenues are the result or accomplishment of the
effort of utilizing resources to create utility. In this
association between expense and revenue, the latter tended
to dominate the relationship in financial accounting. This
is illustrated in the recognition rules which held that
the receipt of revenues signaled the appropriate time for
expenses to be recognized. Historically, revenues also
have been interpreted as a measure of the volume of regular
operations and expenses the effort necessary to support 
20that volume.
19Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory (rev. ed.f 
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. frwin. Inc., 1970), p. 176.
2nWilliam J. Vatter, HThe State of the Art," Abacus, 
VIII (June, 1972), 83.
The preceding discussion focuses attention on the
fact that, traditionally, the interpretation of revenues
and expense has been closely identified with events in~
volving the production of goods and services in the regular
21course of business. But what about events which cause 
an increase or decrease in enterprise economic resources 
in the course of operations, yet are not related to tne 
production of goods and services? There are many examples 
in practice: equipment no longer needed is sold; a fire
destroys a building; inventory items disappear as a result 
of theft; damages are paid in the unfavorable settlement 
of a lawsuit. Accounting has traditionally attempted to 
distinguish these types of events from those that occur 
in the normal course of producing a product or service.
This distinction has primarily been made in the manner in 
which the events are recorded and reported. For example, 
in Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 4, the Committee 
determined that in financial statements, the term expense 
is appropriately limited to the normal, recurring type of 
items such as operating, selling or administrative expenses, 
taxes and interest. Whereas the term loss should be used 
in describing the result of specific transactions which are 
netted in order to distinguish them from the ”. . .  normal
21Sprouse and Moonitz, p. 50.
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expenses of a recurring type which are generally shown in
22gross amounts."
Likewise, in APB Statement No. 4, in discussing
principles of financial statement presentation, the
following view is expressed:
Revenues and expenses from other than sales 
of products, merchandise, or services may be 
separated from other revenues and expenses and 
the net effects disclosed as gains or losses,23
This type of presentation is deemed informative and useful 
in assessing am entity's future prospects. It also is 
reflective of the nature of business activity. The utili­
zation of resources, individually and in combination, in 
the process of creating goods and services results in a 
joint consumption of resources over varying time intervals. 
At the time of consumption of any one resource, it is dif­
ficult if not impossible to make an assessment as to the 
eventual quantum of resources (revenues) that will even­
tually result. Consequently, the diminution in resources 
utilized are recorded in full (gross) to be combined and 
aggregated with similar diminutions and eventually compared 
(matched) with the resources generated in a specified period 
of time. This may be viewed as a composite assessment of 
the contribution rendered by each resource, individually
22AICPA, "Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 4,"
pp. 42-43.
23Statement of the Accounting Principles Board 
No. 4, pp. 94-95.
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and in combination, to the revenues that have been recog­
nized in a specific time interval.
A composite assessment of events involving the 
production and sale of goods and services is generally 
necessary because of the joint contribution of resources 
utilized and the varying lengths of time a contribution 
is rendered.
Events other than those concerned with goods and 
services are generally subject to a greater degree of 
certainty as to the eventual impact on enterprise resources. 
The resources involved are identifiable and limited as to 
the extent of joint effects with other resources. For 
this reason, it is generally feasible to make an immediate 
assessment of the effect on total enterprise resources at 
the time a diminution takes place. As a result, the related 
inflows and outflows of resources are not recorded as 
revenues and expenses, but rather a net increase or decrease 
in enterprise resources is recorded directly along with the 
assessment that a gain or loss has resulted from the event. 
Constitutively, then, revenues and expenses are represented 
by gross increases and decreases in enterprise resources; 
whereas, gains and losses represent net increases and de­
creases in enterprise resources. The presence of revenues 
and expenses indicates that a composite assessment of their 
effects on total enterprise resources is yet to be made;
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whereas, the presence of gains or losses indicates that an 
assessment already has occurred.
From the foregoing analysis, it appears undesir­
able and conceptually inaccurate to describe or view a loss 
as an expense or a sub-classification of an expense. This 
view is implicit in the accounting model of:
Revenues - Expenses * Net Income or Loss 
Alternately, it is sometimes expressed as:
Net Income
(Revenues + Gains} - (Expenses + Losses) * or
Loss
where gains and losses are sub-classifications of revenues 
and expenses respectively.
Conceptually, a more representative expression 
based upon the constitutive nature of the symbols involved 
would be:
Gain or loss from 
Revenues - Expenses * rendering products +
or services
Gains - Losses * Net Income or Loss 
One final aspect that should be addressed in the 
use of the symbol loss is the level of aggregation which 
the symbol represents. The term loss is frequently used in 
the sense of the result of a single event or transaction. 
Used in this context, it is common to attach descriptive 
terms which identify the type of resources diminished and 
the cause of the diminution. For example, some of the 
common loss identifications are: loss on sale of
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securities, loss on the abandonment of equipment, equipment 
fire loss, loss on inventory reduction to market.
The symbol loss is also used in a total or aggre­
gate sense to reflect the total diminution of enterprise 
resources that resulted from business activity for a speci­
fied period. It implies the total or final result of all 
the individual events that were identified and assessed 
immediately and the composite net assessment of numerous 
events incurred in the normal course of producing and sell­
ing goods and services. Used in this context, the qualify­
ing term net is conventionally employed to indicate a final 
or total result.
The identification of a loss in financial accounting 
is a prerequisite to a discussion of its measurement, recog­
nition and classification. The remainder of this chapter 
focuses on these operational aspects.
Measurement of an Accounting Loss
Thus far, losses have been discussed in terms of a 
diminution of economic resources without reference to the 
manner in which a diminution is measured in financial 
accounting. Since losses represent resources that have 
diminished or disappeared, it follows that the measurement 
of this diminution can be derived from the manner in which 
economic resources are measured.
Economic resources can be identified as the scarce 
means necessary to produce goods and services which in turn
satisfy human wants. They are said to be scarce because
their quantities are limited relative to the multiplicity
of uses in satisfying wants. They are distinguished from
free resources which also have the capacity to satisfy
wants but in an unlimited manner since their quantities 
24are infinite. Free resources such as fresh air, sunshine, 
good climate, etc., do not appear as enterprise resources 
from the accounting standpoint, since they are beyond the 
realm of stewardship, responsibility and accountability 
of the entity.
Financial accounting is only concerned with 
economic resources which, because of their limited quanti­
ties relative to their uses, require an economic sacrifice. 
In an exchange economy, one commodity is chosen as the 
medium of exchange in order to facilitate the transfer of 
heterogeneous resources between parties. In the United 
States, the dollar is the medium of exchange, and the ratio 
between dollars and resources is the price of that resource. 
The dollar has also been adopted as the basic unit of 
measurement in financial accounting and all the heteroge­
neous objects and activities of an entity are expressed in 
terms of that one standard, a common denominator— the 
dollar. Under contemporary accounting practice, the stock
24Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Re­
source Allocation (3d ed,; New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1966), p. 5.
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of economic resources and changes in that stock find their
expression in dollar amounts. When economic resources are
acquired by an entity, they are initially accounted for at
the dollar amount given in exchange or the cash equivalent
25of other resources given in exchange. Economic resources 
may be tangible or intangible in nature but it is their 
capacity to satisfy wants and their limited availability 
that commands a price. When a resource is acquired, the 
attribute or characteristic of the resource which is per­
ceived as having the capacity to provide benefits is 
assigned the dollars given or the cash equivalent of other 
resources given in exchange. Changes in the attribute or 
characteristic of the economic resource should be accom­
panied by a proportionate change in the dollar expression
26of that resource in financial accounting.
A loss occurs in a situation where economic 
resources are utilized or disappear without creating an 
equivalent utility. An equivalent utility in this sense 
refers to the generation of economic resources at least
25The discussion of dollar assignments refers to 
the conventional practice of measuring resources in terms 
of historical acquisition cost, commonly referred to as 
the cost principle. Measurements based upon replacement 
costs, exit values, discounted present values or price 
level adjusted costs are beyond the scope of this study.
26A time lag may occur in practice between the 
change in an economic resource and a change in its dollar 
expression as a result of recognition rules conventionally 
followed.
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equal to those expended. Stated in terms of the accounting 
mode of measurement and expression, an equivalent utility 
refers to the generation of a number of dollars at least 
equal to the dollars expended. Failure to do so results 
in a deficiency in terms of a number of dollars, and repre­
sents the accounting measurement and expression of the 
diminution of economic resources that has occurred.
Conceptually, the expression and process of 
measuring a loss is clear and straight-forward, yet there 
are many practical difficulties in arriving at a measure­
ment. Foremost among them is the uncertainty as to the 
eventual consequences of a particular event. At the time 
an event occurs it may be difficult to assess the total 
resources that may be generated (measured in terms of 
dollars) or the total resources that have been expended or 
will be expended (measured in terms of dollars). As a 
consequence, many of the dollar measurements that appear 
in financial accounting statements (losses included), are 
based on an estimate of the eventual outcome of an event. 
Accounting relies heavily on objective evidence not only 
to support the reasonableness of am estimate, but also to 
substantiate that an event has occurred and should be 
measured and reported. The following section addresses 
the problem of loss recognition under present generally 
accepted accounting principles.
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Loss Recognition
Accounting recognition refers to the point in time
in which an event is given formal recognition in the
accounting records. In other words, a change in am
entity's economic resources " . . .  has become sufficiently
definite amd objective to warrant recognition in the 
2 7accounts." Since a major function of accounting is to
provide information about enterprise business activity at
periodic intervals, it is important in an assessment of the
entity's progress that the impact of events is reflected
in the reporting period in which they occur. Concerning
loss recognition, Bedford emphasizes the importance of
this point as follows!
. . . the greater the correlation between 
the loss of services and their recognition, the 
better the measurement. An inconsistent or 
varying recognition point tends to preclude 
interpretation of measured amounts.<6
Under conditions of certainty, a loss would be identified 
and given accounting recognition at the time economic 
resources diminish or disappear without creating an equiva­
lent utility. Unlike expenses, whose recognition are 
closely related to the revenues recognized in the period, 
losses by their nature cannot be associated with current
27Committee on Accounting Concepts and Standards,
p. 3.
28Bedford, Income Determination Theory, p. 173.
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period or prospective resource inflows. Consequently, 
contemporary accounting practice requires that losses be 
recognized in the period they are suffered or in the period 
they are ascertained. To fully appreciate the practical 
problems involved in loss recognition, it is necessary to 
analyze the characteristics of economic resources which 
signal that a diminution has taken place.
The first attribute to be considered may be 
referred to as the quantitative character of all economic 
resources. An enterprise may have one building, ten 
thousand units of merchandise, three thousand accounts 
receivable, four secret processing formuli and any number 
of other quantities of resources. The quantitative char­
acter of economic resources is the numerical expression of 
its existence. A decrease in the numerical quantity of a 
resource without providing an equivalent utility signals 
that a loss has occurred. For example, if a fire completely 
destroys one hundred units of inventory and one hundred 
accounts receivable records, there has been a numerical 
reduction of two types of resources : one tangible and the
other intangible. Of central significance is the fact that 
any one unit of inventory or any one account receivable 
record destroyed possessed the potential to provide bene­
fits, but this potential was never realized because the 
quantitative units possessing the potential no longer 
exist. Casualty losses, such as those resulting from fire.
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flood, theft, or other destruction do not generally cause 
any problems in terms of when the lost resources should be 
recognized. The evidence necessary to substantiate the 
loss is apparent, there being no uncertainty as to the 
definiteness and permanence of the diminution.
Problems do arise, however, in situations where 
there has been a diminution in the utility of a resource 
even though it may still be physically present in its 
quantitative sense. This factor may be referred to as 
the utility characteristic of a resource and from an 
accounting standpoint, its existence or lack thereof, is 
much more difficult to establish. The quantitative char­
acter of a resource can be established by observation and 
count, but the utility characteristic refers to the 
capacity of a resource to eventually generate an inflow 
of resources either through utilization or by exchange. 
Stated in terms of the accounting unit of measure, it is 
the capacity of a resource to eventually generate a dollar 
inflow at least equal to the dollar amount assigned to the 
resource. To the extent that it has this capability, it is 
an enterprise economic resource and is given the accounting 
recognition of an asset awaiting the realization of this 
potential benefit. Should there be a partial impairment 
or a complete disappearance of this capacity to realize 
anticipated benefits, then a loss has been suffered and 
should be given accounting recognition. Changes in the
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utility of a resource can be caused by a variety of 
factors, the majority of which stem from environmental 
factors such as competition, changes in consumer tastes, 
technological advances and governmental decree. Some 
utility changes are abrupt and readily apparent as in the 
case of a governmental decree prohibiting the use of certain 
ingredients or sale of certain products. In many other 
instances, utility changes are gradual and continuous and 
only become apparent after several successive intervals of 
time. It is this type of change which presents some diffi­
culties in the recognition of losses and the procedure 
generally followed is to recognize the loss in the period 
it is ascertained. The practical problem, of course, is 
to evaluate the adequacy of the evidence to substantiate 
the discovery that a loss exists. The evidence deemed 
necessary may vary according to the type of resource lost 
but can include:
1. A verifiable market decline such as in 
the case of a decline in the market value of 
marketable securities, investments and inventory 
items below their cost.
2. An exchange transaction with an outside 
party such as the sale of land, buildings, equip- 
mervET patents, copyrights, or a major segment of 
the business at less than book value.
3. A discretionary management decision to 
write-off, write-down, or abandon such as the 
decision to write-off goodwill, or write-down 
or abandon plant and equipment items.
Whether or not the evidence is convincing enough in each
instance generally requires the use of judgment.
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In the first case, evidence must be gathered to 
determine whether the decline in market value is the 
result of specific adverse conditions that affect a par* 
ticular company's securities or whether the decline is due 
to general economic or market conditions. In either case, 
a judgment must be made as to the permanence of the market 
decline and the prospects for recovery. As regards to a 
decline in the utility of inventories, generally accepted 
practice requires that
Where there is evidence that the utility of 
goods, in their disposal in the ordinary course 
of business, will be less than cost, whether due 
to physical deterioration, obsolescence, changes 
in price levels, or other causes, the difference 
should be recognized as a loss of the current 
period. This is generally accomplished by 
stating such goods at a lower level commonly 
designated as market.29
Implementation of the lower cost or market convention
requires that evidence be gathered for replacement values,
selling prices, costs to complete and dispose and perhaps
information concerning normal margins.
In the second case, an exchange with an outside 
party involving the disposition of resources at less than 
its carrying value is sufficient evidence that a loss has 
been incurred. Although an exchange confirms the fact of 
a loss, it does not necessarily provide evidence that the 
loss in utility occurred in the current period. Physical
29AICPA, Accounting Research and Terminology Bul­
letins, Final EdiCion, p. 30. _ —
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disposition of a resource often lags behind a loss in 
utility and it must be remembered that the decision to 
dispose is an option of management.^ 0
A discretionary management decision to write-off, 
write-down or abandon probably provides the least objective 
evidence that a loss has been incurred in the period it is 
being recognized. It is a fact that business activity 
takes place in a climate of uncertainty as to the eventual 
outcome of various entity actions. A decision by manage­
ment to acquire an economic resource reflects, at the
least, an optimism that the utility of this resource can 
be maintained. When circumstances indicate that there is 
no basis for maintaining this optimism, there may be a 
reluctance on the part of management to make this admis­
sion. The tendency to delay recognition in the hope that 
circumstances may change is not an uncommon occurrence.
In these instances, the discretionary decision to recognize 
a loss is again more of a confirmation that a loss has been 
incurred rather than evidence that the loss in utility 
occurred in the current period.
A final aspect of the difficulties encountered in
loss recognition concerns what may be referred to as loss
contingencies. A loss contingency has been defined as
. . .  an existing condition, situation, or 
set of circumstances involving uncertainty as
30Bedford, Income Determination Theory, p. 173.
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to possible loss to an enterprise that will 
ultimately be resolved when one or more 
future events occur or fail to occur.3i
Thus far, the practical problems in loss recogni­
tion primarily concerned the lag in recognition behind the 
loss in resource utility. A loss contingency provides 
the environment for a similar recognition problem except 
the procedure is reversed. That is, the loss is given 
accounting recognition before there has been a diminution 
in economic resources. In recent years, there have been 
a number of instances where companies appear to be antici­
pating future expenses and losses by setting up provisions 
for general contingencies in the current period. This has
the effect of improving future results by understating
32the results of the current period. Justification for 
this practice often found its basis in the principle of 
conservatism. That is, "anticipate no gains and provide 
for all possible losses." Conceptually this justification 
has no merit inasmuch as the objective of income determina­
tion is to report on the changes in economic resources that 
have taken place as a result of operations in a specified 
period. Fortunately, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board reaffirmed the view that an accounting loss
31FASB, p. 1.
32Leopold A. Bernstein, "Reserve for Future Costs 
and Losses," Financial Analysis Journal, XXVI (January- 
February, 1970).
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represents a diminution in economic resources and should 
not be recognized unless:
(a) Information available prior to issuance 
of the financial statements indicates that it is 
probable that an asset had been impaired or a 
liability had been incurred at the date of the 
financial statements. It is implicit in this 
condition that it must be probable that one or 
more future events will occur confirming the 
fact of the loss.
(b) The amount of loss can be reasonably 
estimated.33
To summarize, the accounting recognition of losses 
in the same period in which the diminution in resources 
takes place is important in arriving at a periodic assess­
ment of an entity’s progress. A loss in resources manifests 
itself in two ways: (1) as a reduction in the quantitative
character of a resource which is the numerical expression 
of its individual units, and (2) as a diminution in its 
utility character which is a resource's capacity to even­
tually generate dollars at least equal to the number of 
dollars assigned to the resource.
A numerical reduction in the units of a resource 
is not particularly troublesome in loss recognition. The 
evidence necessary to substantiate the loss is apparent 
and convincing. On the other hand, the evidence gathered 
to support a loss in the utility of a resource is gener­
ally less convincing, relying primarily on judgment for
33FASB, p. 4.
its interpretation. The practical difficulties to avoid 
from an income determination standpoint is the premature 
recognition of a loss before, in fact, there has been a 
diminution in resources and the recognition of losses in 
periods subsequent to the time resources in fact diminished. 
Either occurrence is undesirable and can lead to misleading 
financial information and the interpretation thereof.
Classification of Accounting Losses
Classification in accounting refers to the grouping 
of items that have some common property or attributes. 
Classification schemes can and do serve a variety of pur­
poses, but one that emphasizes the nature and regularity 
with which events occur appears to be particularly useful 
in predicting the future prospects of an entity.
Losses have been described as operating and non­
operating, expected and unexpected, ordinary and extra­
ordinary, discretionary, catastrophic, gross, net, and a 
variety of other qualifying terms. These classifications 
are not mutually exclusive nor are they only applicable to 
losses, but they do attempt to facilitate interpretation 
of the nature and the frequency with which events may be 
expected to occur. These qualifying categories, however, 
have not been well-defined in the accounting literature; 
at least not to the extent that definitive judgments can 
be made.
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With regard to the manner in which losses appear
on income statements, contemporary accounting practice
tends to focus attention on the regularity with which the
item is likely to appear. An operating loss indicates
that the current effort in rendering a product or service
was not successful and it is often interpreted as some
indication of the company's immediate future prospects.
APB Opinion No. 9 established the extraordinary
category as a separate classification on the income state- 
34ment. APB Opinion No. 30 extended the focus on the
extraordinary classification by clarifying the criteria
35necessary for inclusion in this category. For a loss
to be classified as extraordinary, it must be the result
of an event or transaction which is both unusual in nature
and infrequent in occurrence, due regard being given to
the environment in which the entity operates. If a loss
is material and is the result of events or transactions
which are unusual or occur infrequently, but not both, they
should be reported as a separate component of income.
"Gains or losses of a similar nature that are not indi-
36vidually material should be aggregated." The Opinion is 
not specific whether this latter type should be reported
34APB, "Reporting the Results of Operations," APB 
Opinion No. 9 (New York: AICPA, 1966).
35APB, "Reporting the Results of Operations," APB 
Opinion No. 30 (New York: AICPA, 1973).
36Ibid., p. 568.
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separately, although it is common practice, even though 
conceptually undesirable, to combine these losses under 
the expense category. APB Opinion No. 30 also establishes 
a new classification for the effects of events and transac­
tions involving the disposal of a segment of a business. 
Losses should be separately classified on the income state­
ment if they are the result of a disposal of a major segment 
of the business. In addition, the net operating loss of the 
discontinued operations should also be reported separately. 
To summarize, then, a loss appears on the income statement 
under one or more of the following classifications:
1. As an operating loss (primarily as a result of 
rendering a product or service)
2. As an extraordinary item
3. As discontinued operations
4. As a separa^M^^MM^.material and unusual
5. As a 
infreqr
6. As anjm Lt qualify as
one ^fcgories.
Paton made the ri
Classify 
of convenierJ 
quate if it 
< n li anH 37
purposes 
'/ is ade- 
e purposes
in hand.
Until such time as of financial
statements are definitively uwcermined, any classification 
scheme will be somewhat arbitrary and difficult to 
interpret.
37William A. Paton, Accounting Theory (New Yorks 
The Ronald Press Company, 1922), p. 209.
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separately, although it is common practice, even though 
conceptually undesirable, to combine these losses under 
the expense category. APB Opinion Wo. 30 also establishes 
a new classification for the effects of events and transac­
tions involving the disposal of a segment of a business. 
Losses should be separately classified on the income state­
ment if they are the result of a disposal of a major segment
of the business. In addition, the net operating loss of the 
discontinued operations should also be reported separately. 
To summarize, then, a loss appears on the income statement 
under one or more of the following classifications:
1. As an operating loss (primarily as a result of 
rendering a product or service)
2. As an extraordinary item
3. As discontinued operations
4. As a separate item if material and unusual
5. As a separate item if material and occurs
infrequently
€. As an expense if it does not qualify as 
one of the previous five categories.
Paton made the observation that:
Classifications are primarily for purposes 
of convenience; a particular grouping is ade­
quate if it satisfactorily serves the purposes 
in hand.37
Until such time as the purpose or objectives of financial 
statements are definitively determined, any classification 
scheme will be somewhat arbitrary and difficult to 
interpret.
37William A. Paton, Accounting Theory (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1922), p. 2o9.
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To summarize thus far, it has been determined that 
the accounting symbol "loss" is a significant symbol in 
financial accounting notwithstanding the lack of a clear 
delineation of its nature in accounting theory. A review 
of the accounting literature illustrated a variety of 
interpretations some of which are contradictory and others 
which appear to overlap in meaning with the accounting 
symbol expense. The term loss refers to the process or 
action of diminishment in general. Specifically in a 
financial accounting context, it refers to the diminution 
of enterprise economic resources as a result of unsuccess­
ful business activity. This situation occurs wherever 
economic resources are utilized or disappear without 
creating an equivalent utility. Operationally, a loss 
comes into existence in financial accounting as the result 
of a process of comparing or matching the resource inflows 
and outflows emanating from an event or transaction. This 
assessment of a total diminution in economic resources can 
be made at the time the event or a transaction takes place 
and finds its primary application in those situations where 
all the resources involved can be identified and their 
impact on total enterprise economic resources can be 
isolated from other events and transactions. Or an assess­
ment can be made after a composite accumulation of gross 
inflows (revenues) and outflows (expenses) from a group
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of related events and transactions have taken place. This 
type of assessment finds its applicability in situations 
where there are events and transactions whose individual 
impact on total economic resources cannot be isolated and 
assessed without considering the joint implications of 
related events and transactions. The multitude of activi­
ties required to render a product or service and the vary­
ing periods over which events take place usually necessi­
tates a composite assessment of the type just described.
An accounting loss represents that portion of an 
economic resource which has been expended or which has 
disappeared without creating an equivalent utility. Con­
sequently, a loss is measured and expressed in the same 
manner that economic resources are measured and expressed. 
Conventional accounting practice requires that the acquisi­
tion of an economic resource is properly measured and ex­
pressed in terms of the number of dollars paid (historical 
cost) or the dollar equivalent of other resources given in 
exchange for the resource. Acquisition cost is assigned 
proportionately to the attribute or characteristic of the 
resource which is perceived as possessing utility. A 
diminution in the attribute or characteristic is expressed 
as a proportionate decrease in number of acquisition 
dollars. If the diminution does not result in the creation 
of an equivalent utility, then the dollar reduction is the 
accounting measure and expression of the loss.
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Conceptually, losses should be given accounting 
recognition in the same period that a diminution in 
economic resources takes place. Loss recognition involves 
the gathering of evidence to substantiate that a diminution 
in economic resources is sufficiently definite and perma­
nent to warrant accounting recognition. Resource diminu­
tions which are the result of a numerical reduction of the 
quantitative units of a resource do not usually present 
recognition problems. The evidence to substantiate the 
loss is obvious and convincing. Resource diminutions, 
however, which are the result of a partial or complete 
impairment in the utility of a resource are much more 
difficult to ascertain. Recognition often depends upon 
a discretionary judgment that a loss exists. In practice, 
two difficulties with similar consequences are often en­
countered. First, a loss may be recognized prematurely 
before a diminution in resources has taken place, or, 
second, a loss may be recognized in a period subsequent to 
the period the diminution actually occurred. In either 
case, whether intentional or inadvertent, the consequence 
is a distortion of the current period's results.
The classification of losses as well as other items 
on the income statement are grouped in a manner which tends 
to emphasize the nature and frequency with which events 
occur. This type of presentation is thought to be useful 
in predicting an entity's future prospects. Classifications
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such as operating, non-operating, ordinary, extraordinary, 
discretionary, catastrophic, and unexpected are frequently 
used in grouping losses in published income statements. 
These various qualifying terms are not mutually exclusive 
nor or they well-defined in the accounting literature.
Classification schemes are somewhat arbitrary and 
are useful if they serve some purpose. Until such time 
that the purpose or objectives of financial statements are 
generally agreed upon, classification of items on the 
income statement will continue to overlap in an attempt 
to serve a variety of non-specified purposes.
Chapter 3
THE FINANCIAL BATH REPORTING STRATEGY
Income determination and its presentation in 
financial statements is of the utmost significance to 
parties who have an interest in the economic activities 
of an enterprise. This point is addressed in the AICPA's 
Objectives Study as follows:
Users' continuing needs for assessing 
performance make the measurement of periodic 
earnings an overriding matter. There is an 
inexorability about the calendar. Economic 
decision-makers want information which is 
sufficiently timely to assist them in assess­
ing a company's accomplishments over rela­
tively short periods.1
Many of the conventions employed in contemporary 
accounting are attempts at arriving at an objective assess­
ment of a firm's economic success over a period of time. 
Recognition rules, estimations, allocations, and the like 
are all indispensable in arriving at some meaningful 
measure of performance notwithstanding the uncertain 
environment under which these calculations are made.
Study Group on the Objectives of Financial State­
ments, Objectives of Financial Statements (New York: 
American Institute o£ (Certified Public Accountants, 1973), 
p. 23.
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Income for a period and the trend in earnings over 
several periods is a significant historical input in 
arriving at an assessment of a firm's future prospects. 
Consequently, it is exceedingly important that accounting 
recognition be given to economic resource changes in the 
same period as the changes take place. To the extent that 
this is accomplished, useful relationships may be estab- 
lished between events and environmental conditions existing 
at a particular time and their impact on the economic 
resources of the entity.
As indicated in Chapter 1, there have been frequent 
criticisms in the financial literature which allege that 
some firms are employing accounting and reporting prac­
tices which tend to smooth reported income, thereby impair­
ing the analysis of earnings in the current period and the 
trend in earnings over several periods. The inference is 
that these firms are engaged in some form of deceptive 
reporting practice. This phenomenon is commonly referred 
to in the financial press as taking a "financial bath."
The objective of this chapter is to examine this alleged 
activity by specifying what it is, the motivation for its 
occurrence, how it is implemented, and to examine related 
research into this topic. In addition, the points of 
investigation for this study are developed in this chapter 
and empirically tested in a subsequent chapter.
IDENTIFYING A FINANCIAL BATH
62
The expression "taking a financial bath" has been 
used frequently to describe the sudden appearance of a 
material charge in a company's income statement under 
conditions which suggest that management has timed the 
release of the unfavorable news. In other words, it 
implies a conscious effort on the part of management to 
control the release of the financial impact of events. 
Consequently, it is a behavioral assertion which infers 
an effort on the part of management to manipulate reported 
income.
The question that immediately arises is why manage* 
ment would be motivated to time the recognition of losses. 
Some insight into this question is provided by Hepworth 
when he suggested that:
. . . a relatively stable level of periodic 
income lies in the area of management relations 
with investors and workers. . . . the owners and 
creditors of an enterprise will feel more confi­
dent toward a corporate management which is able 
to report stable earnings than if considerable 
fluctuation of reported earnings exists.2
Similarly, Gordon suggested that it is in management's self-
interest to choose available accounting measurement
2
Samuel R. Hepworth, "Smoothing Periodic Income," 
The Accounting Review, XXVIII (January, 1953), 32-39, as 
reprinted in Readings in Accounting Theory, eds. Paul 
Gardner and Kenneth Berg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1966), p. 266.
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alternatives which will smooth reported income and the rate
3
of growth in income. There have been numerous attempts to 
empirically test whether management does in fact choose 
specific alternative methods of accounting to smooth
4
reported income, but the results have been inconclusive.
Yet the financial bath is frequently cited as a 
financial reporting strategy which management employs to 
shift income from one period to another, thereby being able 
to report less dispersion in the year-to-year income pattern. 
How does a financial bath facilitate this objective? 
Allegedly, the bath involves the release of the effects of 
materially unfavorable events that have accumulated over a 
number of years, all at one time in the current period.
Even though current year's income will be depressed, manage­
ment would be able to show a better earnings picture over 
several prior years before the year of the bath. There may 
even be an incentive to over-estimate the adverse effect in 
the year of recognition so as to provide a reserve or
^Myron J. Gordon, "Postulates, Principles and 
Research in Accounting," The Accounting Review, XXXIX 
(April, 1964), 262.
4
For example, see Ronald M. Copeland, "Income 
Smoothing," Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected
Studies, 1968, supplement to Voi. 5"J Journal of Accounting 
Research, pp. 101-16; C. E. White, "Discretionary Account­
ing Decisions and Income Normalization," Journal of Account­
ing Research, VIII, No. 2 (Autumn, 1970) , 260-73; Ft. M.
Bare field and E. E. Comiskey, "The Smoothing Hypothesis:
An Alternative Test," The Accounting Review, XLVII, No. 2 
(April, 1972), 291-98.
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cushion for future years if needed. Figure 1 illustrates 
the consequences of a financial bath.
Entity Reporting Spectrum
Prior YearsT Current Year
Resulting in over­
statement of income 
in prior years
Future Years
Resulting in over­
statement of income
in future years 
— -------------
(Financial Bath) 
Large material loss 
is recognized that
Relates to resource 
diminutions of prior 
years that were not 
recognized in prior 
years_____________
<---
( Relates tcT resource 
diminutions of 
-> future years that 
will not be recog- 
nized in the future
i
Does not appear to 
relate to events of 
the current period
Resulting in an 
understatement of 
income in the 
current period
Figure 1 
Consequence of a Financial Bath
Of course, implementation by management must be within the 
existing limits of generally accepted accounting principles 
as they pertain to loss recognition. Successful
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implementation requires that management be able to exercise 
discretion as to the recognition of losses and of equal 
importance, they should choose an opportune time period for 
recognition— that is, a period in which public knowledge 
of the loss would have a minimum negative impact. The 
following section assesses management's flexibility as to 
loss recognition and a subsequent section will analyze the 
conditions under which recognition is likely to be 
initiated.
MANAGEMENT JUDGMENT
A company is said to be taking a financial bath 
when it currently recognizes a large material charge to 
income which does not readily appear to be the result of 
events that have taken place in the current period. Prior 
to APB Opinion No. 30, these items frequently made their 
appearance on income statements as extraordinary items. 
Currently, however, they are likely to be reported under 
discontinued operations or as a separate item on the income 
statement,^ In all cases they are reported as losses and 
not expenses.6
5
The provisions of APB Opinion No. 30 specifically 
exclude certain types of events that previously would have 
been classified as extraordinary under the provisions of 
APB Opinion No. 9 .
6Even though APB Opinion No. 30 specifies certain 
events as being usual in nature and can be expected to 
recur, this identification is for purposes of determining
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In Chapter 2, it was determined that the criteria 
for loss recognition under generally accepted accounting 
principles centered on the concept that a loss should be 
recognized in the period it occurs or when it is ascer­
tained. The greater the correlation between the loss of 
economic resources and their recognition, the more meaning­
ful the measurement in describing underlying events and 
activities of the entity. It was also noted that a diminu­
tion in economic resources without creating an equivalent 
utility can occur in two forms:
1. As a numerical decrease in the quantity of 
a resource, and
2. As a partial or complete impairment in the 
utility of a resource.
In the first case, a loss as a result of a numeri­
cal decrease in the quantity of a resource is generally the 
result of some casualty such as fire, flood, earthquake, 
theft, etc. The evidence necessary to substantiate the 
loss is likely to be apparent and convincing. It appears 
extremely unlikely that management would have any other 
option but to recognize the loss in the same period that 
it occurred. The appearance of this type of loss in an 
entity's income statement could hardly be the basis for 
making an assertion that management is attempting to
whether an event is extraordinary; it does not imply a 
distinction between an expense and a loss.
manipulate income when in most instances management has 
very little control over recognition of these events.
In the case where the utility of an economic 
resource is impaired, the availability of evidence to sub 
stantiate the loss is not always apparent. As a conse­
quence, a loss may be recognized in a period when a 
judgment is made by management that a resource has been 
impaired. It is conceivable then that management could 
choose, for one reason or another, to delay recognition 
of the loss until some subsequent period. This possi­
bility stems from the fact that, in most instances, the 
resource is still physically present in its quantitative 
sense even though it has lost its capacity to generate 
resources in the future.
It is this type of situation where management 
appears to be able to exercise discretion when the loss 
will be recognized. And it is this type of situation 
where the accusation of taking a financial bath usually 
occurs. As an extension of this same situation, "bath 
behavior" is also attributed to those situations where, 
allegedly, management makes a premature judgment that a 
loss has been incurred. That is, recognition is made 
currently for future anticipated diminutions in resources
To summarize, then, generally accepted accounting 
principles require that a loss be recognized whenever it 
is incurred or ascertained. Ascertainment that a loss
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has been suffered in many cases is dependent upon a 
management judgment that it exists and a decision that it 
should be recognized. Often a loss in the utility of a 
resource precedes its actual physical disposition, hence 
its recognition is not evidenced by an exchange transac­
tion with an external independent party. Its recognition 
primarily rests upon a judgment by management that it 
exists. Under these circumstances, it is conceivable that 
management could exercise its discretion in recognizing a 
loss in order to manipulate reported income.
TIMING OF A FINANCIAL BATH
A financial bath reporting strategy involves 
reporting all the so-called bad news at one time thereby 
restricting any negative reaction to that period. Of 
central importance then is for management to choose the 
"right" time period to make the revelation. Presumably, 
investors prefer projects that result in gains and 
increased earnings and tend to judge the ability and 
efficiency of management on the basis of this criteria. 
Projects which result in losses and the reporting thereof 
would, in all probability, be perceived by management as 
an undesirable situation reflecting unfavorably upon their 
administration. Since it has been determined that the 
criteria for loss recognition does allow for some flexi­
bility or discretion as to recognition, it is not at all
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inconceivable that management might attempt to postpone 
recognition of unfavorable news until a period perceived 
as convenient— that is, a period in which public knowledge 
of the loss would have a minimum negative impact.
What then are some conditions that management might 
perceive as being conducive in implementing a financial 
bath? In reviewing the financial literature, the following 
four conditions are frequently mentioned: (1) a change in
top management, (2) a decline in the level of income,
(3) the presence of an extraordinary gain, and (4) a 
decline in the market value of the entity's stock. The 
rationale why each of these conditions might provide an 
environment conducive to implementing a financial bath is 
analyzed in this section.
Change in Top Management
A change in top management appears to be a conveni­
ent time to recognize material charges and write-offs.
Past mistakes can be cleaned up with one sweep and the 
blame leveled against the old management, thereby setting 
the stage for an immediate recovery under the new leader­
ship. Commenting on this possibility, Bernstein cautions 
that this is also a likely time when reserves for future 
costs and losses are likely to be established. The objec­
tive of these vague all-purpose reserves is ". . .to 
relieve future income of costs and expenses properly
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7
chargeable to it." In this way, the new management can 
assure improved future operating results immediately.
This phenomenon is often described as "moving income down­
stream to future years where it may be needed to provide
g
a smooth growth curve."
In his 1966 empirical study, Bernstein found only
two instances where over-provisions of loss reserves were
subsequently reversed. However, he did observe that
charges made to previously recorded reserves were often
lacking in sufficient details to evaluate the propriety of 
9
the amounts. In a related study, Laibstain and Huff 
examined reports of 600 companies for the years 196 7 
through 1969 and found relatively few cases of loss esti­
mates that were subsequently corrected. However, of the 
ones that they did find, 79 percent involved credit cor­
rections which supported their contention that when errors 
are made in loss estimates, there is a tendency to over­
estimate .
7
Leopold A. Bernstein, "Reserve for Future Costs 
and Losses," Financial Analyst Journal, XXVI (January- 
February, 19 76) , 4 7. — - -
Q
Arlene Hershman, "Accounting: New Numbers, Same
Game," Dunn's Review, August, 19 72, p. 84. 
a
Leopold A. Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary 
Gains and Losses (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1967),
18 3
^Samuel Laibstain and Thomas Huff, "The Financial 
Reporting of Revised Loss Estimates," Financial Analyst 
Journal, XXVII (May-June, 1971), 62.
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In another study, Moore attempted to empirically 
test the relationship between changes in top management 
and discretionary accounting decisions which reduced 
income.11 The Wall Street Journal was scanned for a four- 
year period, 1966 through 1969, in order to identify 
changes in top management. A top management change was 
defined as a replacement of either the president, chief 
executive officer, or chairman of the board with new 
individuals or if management described itself as "new 
management." Requests were made for 265 annual reports 
of companies suspected of management changes and 16 5 
reports were received. Of these, 36 reports were defi­
nitely identified as management change reports. Twenty- 
three of the 36 reports contained discretionary accounting 
decisions which reduced income. The sample was compared 
to the number of income reducing decisions appearing in 
two other independent samples: (1) a random sample of 100
reports with personnel changes that did not qualify as a 
change in top management, and (2) a random sample of 100 
reports with no known changes in top management. Employing 
the chi-square statistical test of independence, both tests 
revealed a significant difference at the .001 level in the 
number of income reducing decisions recognized between the
11Michael L. Moore, "Management Changes and Discre­
tionary Accounting Decisions," Journal of Accounting Re­
search, XI, No. 1 (Spring, 1973T"i 10d-l0>.
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management change firms and the firms in the two independent
samples. On the basis of this evidence, Moore concluded
that income reducing decisions are more likely to be made
in a period when there has been a change in top management.
He cautions, however, that no cause and effect relationship
should be inferred and that it is possible that management
changes and income reducing discretionary decisions are
both the result of some third factor such as a decline in
12the level of a company's income.
Reduced Level of Income
In references to the financial bath, it is often 
suggested that large material charges to income are more 
likely to occur when results before these losses are down 
from previous years. In other words, if results of opera­
tions are adverse anyway, why not even make it worse by 
revealing all the bad news at once?
For example, in 1972 Gulf Oil Company announced a 
16 percent decline in operating income from the previous 
year and the recognition of a $250 million special charge 
which gave a final net decrease in income from the previous 
year of slightly over 60 percent. In early 19 73, but before 
the 1972 results were published, Gulf announced that it was 
revising 1972 results to include a $25 million charge as a 
result of the February, 1973, dollar devaluation. After
■^2Moore, pp. 106-107.
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inclusion of this charge, 1972's level of income was nearly
1365 percent lower than the previous year.
Although this is only one instance, it is illus­
trative of numerous similar examples cited in a variety of
14financial publications. The major contention is the
seemingly common tendency for management to recognize all 
bad news at one time. In addition, management appears to 
have a preference for recognizing the unfavorable news in 
a year in which . . earnings are expected to be lack­
luster, anyhow, giving the profit and loss statement 'one
big bath* and, it's hoped, a limited impact on the price
15of the company's stock.” In other words, management
finds itself in a difficult situation, that is, having to 
report bad news in the form of lower earnings. A negative 
reaction from investors is to be anticipated but the re­
action may change by diminishing marginal amounts as the 
amount of bad news increases. Whether or not this happens
13Fredrick Andrews, "Some Accountants Assail Gulf’s 
Revision of *72 Results to Reflect *73 Devaluation," The 
Wall Street Journal, Midwest ed., February 22, 1973, p. 17, 
coi'. n
14For example, see Bernstein, "Reserve for . . 
pp. 45-48; "The Big Bath," Newsweek, July 27, 1970, pp. 54, 
57-58; "The Year of the Big Bath," Forbes, March 1, 1971, 
pp. 42-43; The Executive Investor, "After the Write-offs,
A Rebound," Dunn1s Review, September, 1972, pp. 107-108.
15Charles N. Stabler, "SEC to Tighten 'Big Bath' 
Disclosure Rules for Firms' Accounting, But in Diluted 
Form," The Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1973, p. 14, 
col. 1.
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in fact is not the issue at this point, but if management 
believes this to be true, then this could explain a relation 
ship between a lower level of earnings and bath behavior.
Presence of Extraordinary Gains
Companies whose earnings vacillate from period to 
period are looked upon as possessing a greater degree of 
risk than a company whose earnings exhibit less dispersion.
A smooth steadily increasing earnings trend is preferred.
A large gain recognized in one period may push net income 
to a level which may be difficult to duplicate in subse­
quent years.
In his empirical study of extraordinary gains and 
losses, Bernstein observed a tendency for companies to 
offset material gains and losses.16 Discussing this prac­
tice in a later article, he noted that what makes the con­
current appearance of some gains and losses suspect is when 
the charge is the result of a provision for future costs 
and losses and the amount is approximately the same as the 
recognized gain. The inference is whether the charge to 
income would have been made at all without the offsetting 
benefit of the gain.17
The joint appearance of material gains and losses 
may be nothing more than the accurate reporting of specific
16Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary, p. 183.
17Bernstein, "Reserve for . . . p. 46.
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events that simultaneously occurred. On the other hand, 
the presence of a large gain in a period might also be 
viewed by management as an opportune time to release news 
of unfavorable events that have gone unrecognized. A large 
gain could serve to partially reduce or offset the negative 
reaction that might result from the recognition of a 
material loss.
Decline in Market Value 
of Company's Stock
Another existing condition which might be perceived 
as a convenient time to recognize a material charge to in­
come is when the per share price of the company's stock is 
selling materially below what it was in previous periods.
As a matter of fact, it has been suggested that the "bath" 
be used as a tactic to take advantage of a bear market. 
Ponder this advice:
Consider writing off those bad results you 
have been hiding for years. After all, if your 
stock is down 50 per cent already, how much 
worse can it get?l8
If a company's stock is selling at depressed levels 
as a result of factors within that company or even because 
of general economic conditions, the release of bad news is 
not expected to elicit a proportionate reaction. This atti­
tude also finds its rationale in the belief that increasing
18 "How C-E Gears Its Financial PR to the Bear 
Market," The Corporate Communications Report, June, 1970, 
p. 5.
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amounts of bad news is subject to a decreasing marginal 
reaction. Therefore, if a company has unfavorable news, 
and management can exercise discretion when the financial 
effects can be recognized, an adverse reaction can be some­
what mitigated by postponing recognition until a period 
when investors' expectations are at a low level.
Thus far, a review of the financial literature 
indicated frequent references to an alleged financial 
reporting strategy employed by management to minimize 
investor reaction to unfavorable news. This activity is 
commonly referred to as "taking a financial bath" and 
involves the current recognition of a material loss which 
does not appear to be the result of activities that have 
taken place in the current period. Central to a successful 
implementation are the requirements that:
1. Management reporting activities give the 
appearance of falling within the broad limits 
permissible under generally accepted accounting 
principles.
2. Management is able to time the recog­
nition of losses in a period when the "right" 
conditions are present.
The references cited thus far, which imply that certain 
conditions be present in order to maximize the benefit of 
employing a bath, have some limitations. With the possible 
exception of the Moore study, most conclusions were reached 
as a result of a limited number of observations and reflect 
a perceived relationship by the authors without any substan­
tial organized research effort to support the relationships
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empirically. The following section describes two empirical 
studies which support the contention that financial baths 
do occur and that there are conditions under which manage­
ment is more likely to implement a financial bath than 
others.
RE LATED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
There appears to be a paucity of research concern­
ing the financial bath phenomenon, yet there is ample 
reference to it in describing certain firm behavior. An 
empirical study by Copeland and Moore and another by 
Charles Merz are the only two that this writer is aware of 
that specifically address this topic. Both studies conclude 
that firms do take financial baths? that it is an increasing 
phenomenon? and there are certain conditions under which a 
firm is more likely to take a financial bath. This section 
examines these studies in detail.
Copeland and Moore Study
The authors set out to determine the frequency with
which the bath phenomenon occurs and to examine the economic
19conditions that exist when a bath is implemented.
The annual reports of 1,000 randomly selected 
companies from those listed on the Compustat Tapes was
19Ronald M. Copeland and Michael L. Moore, "The 
Financial Bath; Is It Common?" MSU Business Topics, XX 
(Autumn, 1972), 63-69.
requested for the five-year period 1966 through 1970. A 
total of 3,761 reports were received from 907 companies. 
Each of these reports were examined in order to identify 
those companies exhibiting bath behavior. Bath behavior 
was operationally defined as the recognition of:
. . . certain discretionary accounting 
decisions that reduce income before these 
decisions by 10 percent or more. A discre­
tionary accounting decision is made by 
management whenever it determines the exis­
tence of changed conditions which justifies 
a nonexchange adjustment.20
There were 195 reports identified as companies 
suspected of taking a financial bath. The frequency of 
bath to total reports each year is indicated in Table 2.
Table 2
Percentage of Total Reports With 
Bath Characteristics 
(Copeland and Moore)
Year Percentage
1970 7. 58
1969 6.08
1968 4.14
1967 4.35
1966 3.12
20Copeland and Moore, pp. 64-6 5.
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The authors concluded that, based upon the observed 
frequencies, bath behavior did not appear to be a wides- 
spread activity but that it was increasing and could be 
developing into a serious reporting problem.
The next phase of their research concerned testing 
the relationships between income movements, stock price 
movements and discretionary accounting decisions. They 
compared the group of companies that were suspected of 
taking a financial bath with a random sample of 100 com­
panies that did not exhibit bath behavior. The following 
tests were made for both bath companies and non-bath 
companies to determine:
1. If current income before discretionary 
accounting decisions relative to prior year's 
income was significantly different for the two 
samples.
2. If the proportion of companies incurring 
losses before the discretionary accounting deci­
sion was significantly different for the two 
samples.
3. If the current year-end market price per 
share of stock relative to the prior year-end 
price per share was significantly different for 
the two samples.
In the first test of income movements, the Mann- 
Whitney U test was employed and a significant difference 
was found in four of the five years tested. With the 
exception of 1966, companies which recognized income 
reducing accounting decisions had significantly greater 
declines in income before these decisions than a random 
sample of non-bath companies.
80
In the second test, the chi-square test was 
employed in each of the five years. It was found that in 
each of the years tested the bath companies had a signifi­
cantly greater proportion of losses before the discretion­
ary accounting decision than did non-bath companies. The 
authors concluded that this tended to support the contention 
that the sample companies were taking a bath, and that a 
period of adverse results appeared to be a condition which 
was conducive to its implementation.
In the final test using the Mann-Whitney test, 
they found a significant difference in stock price move­
ments between bath and non-bath companies in three of the 
five years tested. However, the authors noted a high corre­
lation between stock price movements and income movements 
in the bath companies; consequently, the significant dif­
ference achieved could possibly have been attributed to
21income movements.
To summarize, Copeland and Moore found that the 
frequency with which bath behavior was observed ranged 
between approximately 3 percent and 8 percent over the 
five-year test period; that it was an increasing phenomenon 
and that there was a significant statistical relationship 
between companies which recognize material discretionary
21Copeland and Moore, p. 67.
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charges and declines in income before the discretionary 
charge.
Charles Merz Study
In another empirical study, Merz also attempted
to establish the frequency with which companies employ the
financial bath and to test how discretionary losses were
related to a variety of business factors existing within 
22the firm. A sample of 50 companies taken from Fortune1s
500 Industrial Companies for each of the six years from
1967 through 1972 was used to establish the frequency with
2 3which companies recognize "unrealized losses." Table 3 
illustrates the percentage of companies in each sample of 
50 companies that exhibited bath behavior. Merz concluded 
that the number of companies recognizing unrealized losses 
reflected an increasing trend and that this constituted a 
serious reporting problem.
22Charles M. Merz, "Extraordinary Losses Which 
Have Not Been Realized: Frequency of Occurrence Related
to Other Business Factors" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Southern California, 1974).
2 3The references to discretionary accounting 
decisions that reduce income, unrealized losses, and 
discretionary losses as used in the Copeland and Moore 
study, Merz study, and this study respectively; all 
generally refer to the same type of situation. That is, 
a loss in economic resources which have not been evidenced 
by an exchange transaction with an outside party and whose 
recognition depends upon a managerial decision that a loss 
has been incurred.
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Table 3
Percentage of Companies With 
Unrealized Losses 
(Merz)
Year Percentage
1972 16.0
1971 18.0
1970 16.0
1969 10.0
1968 6.0
1967 4.0
Merz then tested for a relationship between the 
incidence of an unrealized loss and the following six 
conditions which may exist within the firms:
1. A reversal in the trend of annual income 
before extraordinary items.
2. The occurrence of an extraordinary gain 
which "offsets" at least one-half of the un­
realized loss.
3. The presence of intangible assets in the 
corporation's balance sheet.
4. The number of acquisitions made by the 
corporation in its two preceding fiscal years.
5. A replacement of the chief executive 
officer during the year in which the unrealized 
loss was recognized.
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6. A change in the public accounting firm 
which audits the corporation's financial state­
ments .24
Using multivariate chi-square analysis, he found statisti­
cally significant relationships between discretionary losses 
and two of the six variables tested: (1) the trend in
earnings, and (2) offsetting extraordinary gains. On the 
basis of his investigation, Merz concluded that firms tend 
to use loss recognition as a means of manipulating net 
income in the following manner:
If income from operations had declined, 
corporations tended to take the "financial bath" 
in the form of an unrealized loss. If an off­
setting extraordinary gain had occurred during 
the year, corporations tended to smooth their 
trend of net income by recognizing an unrealized 
loss.25
SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIOR STUDIES 
TO THIS RESEARCH
The numerous references to the financial bath in 
the financial literature give the impression that, in many 
instances, management is engaged in a form of income 
manipulation. Admittedly, most references are based upon 
casual observations of a limited number of cases, but the 
frequency with which the activity is observed and the 
magnitude of the amounts involved should concern all who 
have an interest in the reporting activities of business 
firms.
24Merz, p. 62. 25Merz, p. 119.
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The empirical studies by Copeland and Moore and 
by Charles Merz tend to support the allegations of finan­
cial bath activity by providing evidence that firms do 
take financial baths; that it appears to be an increasing 
phenomenon and that there is a statistical relationship 
between the existence of certain conditions and the inci­
dence of bath activity. Specifically, it was found that if 
a firm experienced a decline in operating income relative 
to prior year's income, or if a firm experienced an extra­
ordinary gain in the current period, it was more likely to 
make a discretionary accounting decision to recognize a 
loss.
Neither study, however, tested the important aspect 
of a reaction by investors to the recognition of a material 
discretionary loss. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in Accounting Series Release No. 138 expressed its 
concern over the increasing number of companies recognizing 
large charges to income and indicated that these charges
2 6often came without warning and surprised many investors. 
With the release of news that a material charge to income 
is to take place, one would expect a market impact on the 
security price of firms making these discretionary account­
ing decisions. The financial bath reporting strategy
2 6Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting 
Series Release No. 138, January 12, 1973, 38 F~ R. 2446.
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discussed previously suggests such a reaction, but it also 
implies that this impact can be influenced by timing the 
release of the news in a period when certain conditions 
are present. In other words, management is faced with 
reporting a loss of economic resources to investors who 
have an interest in those resources; consequently, it is 
not unlikely that management would make an effort to re­
lease the news in a period they perceive would cause the 
least negative response. The fact that a statistical 
relationship has been found between bath type behavior and 
the existence of certain conditions strongly suggests that 
management perceives these conditions as being conducive 
in minimizing investor reaction. If this can be empiri­
cally verified, then perhaps the increasing number of firms 
recognizing material charges can be explained by the fact 
that more and more managements have come to recognize this 
as a successful reporting strategy. In other words, it 
enables them to make the best of a bad situation and it is 
in their self-interest to implement it when the conditions 
are "right."
Whether or not investors do react to the release 
of unfavorable news and if a reaction is different when 
certain conditions are present is subject to empirical 
verification and is the point of investigation in this study. 
The other studies dealing with the financial bath phenomenon 
have established that a relationship exists between the
recognition of a discretionary loss and the presence of 
certain conditions. This study extends the research in 
this area by addressing the following questions: Is the
financial bath reporting strategy valid? In other words, 
are investors surprised by the reporting of a bath-type 
charge and what is their reaction? Can management in­
fluence a reaction by timing the recognition of these 
charges in a period when certain conditions are present? 
Therefore, a major objective of this study is to empiri­
cally test whether there is a market reaction to the 
announcement of a discretionary loss and whether or not a 
reaction can be modified by timing the recognition in a 
period when certain conditions are present. The hypotheses 
tested in this study are developed in Chapter 4 along with 
an explanation of the research methodology employed.
Chapter 4
THE INVESTIGATION
The empirical phase of this study has three 
principal thrusts:
(1) To test whether the announcement of a 
discretionary loss has informational content for 
i nvestors.
(2) To test whether investors view the 
announcement of a discretionary loss as unfavor­
able news.
(3) To determine the validity of the finan­
cial bath reporting strategy by testing whether 
investor reaction to the announcement of a dis­
cretionary loss is different when certain 
conditions are present.
Much of the criticisms directed toward firms 
suspected of employing the financial bath reveal a concern 
that investors are being misled by this practice. If this 
is true, then the announcement that a discretionary loss 
will be recognized should cause investors to assess the 
significance of this information and to react in a manner 
which reflects their expectations for the firm. The re­
search methodology employed in this study measures the 
magnitude and direction of any investor reaction at the 
time knowledge of the discretionary loss becomes public.
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EFFICIENT MARKETS AND INVESTOR REACTION 
TO NEW INFORMATION
There is a substantial body of research which 
indicates that the market is efficient and will react 
quickly and in an unbiased manner to all publicly avail­
able information."^ This reaction takes the form of 
changes in the equilibrium price of a security as a result 
of a change in the market's assessment of future returns 
for that security. If a particular news item about a 
security has informational content, a change in the equi­
librium price of that security can be observed at or 
around the time the news item becomes publicly known.
A number of empirical studies have shown that the 
market is efficient in processing new information and that 
changes in the equilibrium price of a security occurs 
rapidly after the announcement of the information. Fama, 
et al., tested the market's reaction to the announcement 
of stock splits and found that "the information implica­
tions of a split are fully reflected in the price of a 
share at least by the end of the split month but most
2
probably almost immediately after the announcement date."
^See Eugene F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets:
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," The Journal of 
Finance, XXV (May, 1970), 383-417.
2
Eugene F. Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen, 
and Richard Roll, "Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Infor­
mation," International Economic Review, X (February, 1969), 
20.
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In another empirical study, Beaver tested the
3
informational content of annual earnings announcements. 
Using a sample of 143 firms listed on the Compustat Tapes 
for the years 1961 through 19 65, he hypothesized that if 
the annual earnings announcement provided new information 
to investors, this would be reflected in:
(1) a greater variability in price changes 
when earnings are announced than at other times 
during the year.
(2) a greater number of shares being traded 
when the earnings are announced than at other 
times during the year.
Beaver observed both volume and price changes for a 17-weeJc
period surrounding 506 earnings announcements. His data
indicate a mean increase of approximately 30 percent in
the number of shares traded in the week earnings were
announced than the mean volume traded in all other weeks
(excluding the 17-week test period). Similarly, he found
the price activity in the week of earnings announcement to
be four times larger than the mean price activity during
the other weeks. On the basis of this evidence, Beaver
concluded that the individual investor and the market as a
whole perceive informational content in annual earnings
announcements and that this perception occurs rapidly after
the earnings information is made public. A similar
^William H. Beaver, "The Informational Content of 
Annual Earnings Announcements," Empirical Research in 
Accounting: Selected Studies, 1968, Supplement to Vol, 6,
Journal of Accounting Research, pp. 67-100.
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conclusion was reached by Robert May in an empirical study
4
using quarterly earnings announcements. The above studies
tested the speed with which new information is impounded in
the market price of securities and are consistent with the
5
semi-strong form of the efficient markets theory. A
number of other studies have been made utilizing changes in
security prices to measure reaction to accounting changes
and the desirability of alternative methods of accounting.6
Efficient markets theory appears to provide a
particularly suitable framework for assessing the effects
7of accounting procedures or regulations. Of course,
4
Robert G. May, "The Influence of Quarterly Earn­
ings Announcements on Investors Decisions as Reflected in 
Common Stock Price Changes," Empirical Research in Account­
ing: Selected Studies, 19 71, Supplement to Vol. 9, Journal
of Accounting Research, pp. 119-71.
'’Tests of the efficient markets hypothesis are 
described as weak, semi-strong, and strong form depending 
upon how information is defined. Weak form tests concern 
historical prices, semi-strong tests concern all publicly 
available information, and strong form tests concern all 
information. For a concise description, see Baruch Lev, 
"Efficient Capital Markets," Financial Statement Analysis:
A New Approach (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey! Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., T5"74) , Chap. 14, pp. 218-20.
6 See, for example, William Beaver, Paul Kettler, 
and Myron Scholes, "The Association between Market Deter­
mined and Accounting Risk Measures," The Accounting Review, 
XLV (October, 1970), 654-82; William Beaver and-R. E. Dukes, 
"Interperiod Tax Allocation, Earnings Expectations, and the 
Behavior of Security Prices," The Accounting Review, XLVII 
(April, 1972), 320-32.
*1
Nicholas J. Gonedes and Nicholas Dopuch, "Capital 
Market Equilibrium, Information Production, and Selecting 
Accounting Techniques: Theoretical Framework and Review of
Empirical Work," Studies on Financial Accounting Objectivesi
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empirical evidence of effects would seem to be a pre­
requisite in evaluating the allegations of effects attrib­
uted to certain accounting and reporting practices. A 
major function of this study is to provide evidence of the 
effects of a financial bath. This evidence is used to 
either substantiate or refute the alleged effects 
attributed to financial bath activity.
RESEARCH DESIGN
If investors are surprised by the large charges to 
income made by companies suspected of employing the finan­
cial bath as the SEC and other critics maintain, their 
reaction can be measured by observing the security price 
adjustments that take place in and around the time the 
charge becomes public knowledge. Security price adjust­
ments can also be observed to test whether investor re­
action is different when certain conditions are present. 
Specifically, the financial bath reporting strategy sug­
gests that losses be recognized in a period when one or 
more of the following conditions exist:
(1) There has been a change in the top manage­
ment of the firm.
(2) Current earnings are at a lower level rela­
tive to previous periods.
1974, Supplement to Vol. 12, Journal of Accounting 
Research, pp. 48-129.
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(3) The company's current market price per 
share of common stock is down from previous 
periods.
(4) An extraordinary gain is present to 
partially or fully offset the charge.
In the case of a top management change, Moore found
a significant relationship between discretionary losses and
g
changes in top management. Even though a period of 
management change appears to be conducive to financial 
bath activity, its implementation is limited to once per 
new management. Therefore, it is a condition which does 
not lend itself to a systematic means of manipulating re­
ported income by an incumbent management; consequently, it 
will not be a test condition in this study. However, 
instances of top management changes in the sample companies 
used in this study will be noted and reported.
Copeland and Moore and Charles Merz both found a 
significant relationship between current earnings decline
relative to prior years' earnings and the recognition of
g
discretionary losses. This strongly suggests that a 
period of adverse results is viewed by management as a
ft
Michael L. Moore, "Management Changes and Dis­
cretionary Accounting Decisions," Journal of Accounting 
Research, XI, No. 1 (Spring, 1973)^ 100-1(1)7.
g
Ronald M. Copeland and Michael L. Moore, "The 
Financial Bath: Is It Common?" MSU Business Topics, XX
(Autumn, 1972), 63-69; Charles M. Merz, "Extraordinary 
Losses Which Have Not Been Realized; Frequency of 
Occurrence Related to Other Business Factors" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern 
California, 1974).
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condition which is conducive to financial bath activity. 
Allegedly, the market reaction to a large charge when 
earnings are already down will be less adverse than if 
the large charge was recognized when current earnings are 
greater than in prior years. A similar rationale holds 
that a lesser negative reaction will occur if the charge 
is recognized in a period when the company's common stock 
current market price is lower than in prior years than it 
would if the charge were recognized in a period when the 
stock was selling at a higher price than in previous years.
Finally, an adverse reaction to a material charge 
can be minimized if recognized in a period when an extra­
ordinary gain exists rather than if the charge were recog­
nized in a period where there is no extraordinary gain to 
offset it. To summarize, the test conditions used in this 
study involve income movements, stock price movements and 
the presence or absence of extraordinary gains.
Sample Plan
The firms chosen for this study were taken from 
the Fortune 500 Industrial Companies for 197 3. This group 
of companies was selected for several reasons. First, they 
represent some of the largest and most successful companies 
in the country. As a consequence, their activities are 
closely monitored by all sectors of the economy, including 
being independently audited, for the most part, by the big 
national public accounting firms. Accounting and reporting
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practices employed by these firms would tend to mirror 
contemporary practice and would be quite influential in 
establishing the acceptability of any new accounting or 
reporting presentations. A second reason for choosing the 
Fortune 500 companies is because their securities are, for 
the most part, well-known, widely held, and actively traded. 
Financial data regarding their activities are generally 
obtainable.
Initially, the annual reports for each of the 500 
companies was examined in order to identify those companies 
which are suspected of taking a financial bath and are hence 
forth referred to as the "bath companies."
Definition of Terms
The financial bath is implemented by recognition of 
material charges to income in the income statement. The 
material charges of interesL in this study are those events 
that have the accounting designation "loss." The term 
"loss" in accounting is variously described as: ordinary,
extraordinary, catastrophic, discretionary, realized, un­
realized, expected, unexpected, gross, net, and a variety 
of other qualifying terms. In order to limit the scope of 
this study, attention is directed only to those losses which 
are the result of a discretionary decision by management.
In the judgment of this writer, this type of loss would be 
most susceptible to the timing requirements in the imple­
mentation of a financial bath.
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Ideally, a loss should be recognized whenever 
service factors have diminished. Some losses are clearly 
related to identifiable events which have caused the 
diminution of service factors. Others are not so clearly 
related and are the result of a judgment by management 
that an expiration of service has taken place. It is the 
latter type which are referred to as discretionary losses 
in this study. For example, if uninsured plant and equip­
ment items are destroyed by fire, the event and diminution 
of service factors are readily apparent. On the other hand, 
if plant and equipment items are still physically present 
but are written-off or written-down because of a diminu­
tion of expected benefits, the loss and the events which 
caused it are not as readily apparent. The recognition of 
the loss and its amount is not dependent upon some readily 
identifiable event or exchange transaction but rather on a 
management decision that a loss of service factors has taken 
place. Management can exercise discretion when it might 
choose to make this decision.
It is necessary to establish criteria for identify­
ing bath companies. It is unlikely that direct correspon­
dence with companies asking if they are taking a financial 
bath would produce reliable results. Consequently, a 
company suspected of taking a financial bath is operation­
ally defined in this study as a company that reports a 
material loss which is the result of a discretionary
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management decision. This would include write-offs, 
write-downs, and provisions for future costs which have 
not been evidenced by an exchange transaction at the 
balance sheet date. A material loss is defined as one 
which reduces income before the charge by 10 percent or 
more.
After the bath companies were identified, the 
sample was classified into various groups which exhibit 
the conditions that are of interest in the testing of the 
statistical hypotheses of this study. The initial classi­
fication of the bath companies was designed to test for the 
current year's income relative to prior year's income con­
dition. Group I consists of bath companies whose net 
income in the prior year was equal to or greater than 
current year's income before discretionary losses. Group II 
consists of bath companies whose net income in the prior 
year was less than current year's income before the 
discretionary loss.
The next classification tests for the current market 
price per share relative to the prior year’s market price 
condition. Group III consists of bath companies whose 
average market price per share of common stock for the 
prior year is equal to or greater than the average market 
price per share of common stock in the current year.
Group IV consists of bath companies whose average market 
price per share of common stock for the prior year was less
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than the average market price per share of common stock in 
the current year. Average price per share of common stock 
is defined as:
N
P = 1 \  p
T T  /  m
in^T—
Where :
P = average price per share of common
stock
P = the closing price per share of common
stock on the last day of the month
m = month identification; January » 1,
February = 2, . . . December = 12
N * number of months in year 
Finally, bath companies were reclassified to test 
for the presence of an extraordinary gain in the current 
period relative to its absence condition. Group V con­
sists of bath companies which also recognize an extra­
ordinary gain in the current period. Group VI consists of 
bath companies which have not recognized an extraordinary 
gain.
The Experimental Variables
Security price adjustments for an eight-week period 
were observed in order to assess the market reaction to the 
announcement of the recognition of a material discretionary 
loss. The week of announcement was designated as week 0. 
The test period encompasses the three-week period prior to 
the week of announcement (-3, -2f -1), and the week of
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announcement, plus the subsequent four weeks (0, +1, +2, 
+3, +4).
A weekly logarithmic price relative was used to 
measure the market reaction. This measure has been em­
ployed in a number of other studies and can be viewed as 
a security's weekly rate of return with continuous com­
pounding.^ It is defined as follows:
PR.. = Init
Where:
PR.. = the natural logarithm of the price
relative of the i th firm's common 
stock at time t
D.. = the cash dividend per share of firm
1 i in the week t that the security
went ex-dividend
P.. - the closing price for a share of
firm i at the end of week t
P'-t , = the closing price for a share of
firm i at the end of week t-1 
adjusted for capital changes
For example: William H. Beaver, "The Informa­
tional Content . . pp. 67-100; Robert S. Kaplan and
Richard Roll, "Investor Evaluation of Accounting Informa­
tion: Some Empirical Evidence," Journal of Business,
Vol. 45 (April, 1972), 225-57; Elba F. feaskin, "Communica­
tive Effectiveness of Consistency Exceptions," The Account­
ing Review, XLVII (January, 19 72), 38-51; T. Ross Archibald, 
"Stock Market Reaction to the Depreciation Switch-Back,"
The Accounting Review, XLVII (January, 1972), 22-30;
Dennis H. Pat2 and James R. Boatman, "Accounting Principle 
Formulation in an Efficient Markets Environment," Journal 
of Accounting Research, X, No. 2 (Autumn, 19 72), 393-4013.
Dit pit
it-l
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There are a number of factors which may affect the 
weekly rate of return of an individual security. Not the 
least of them would be the general economic conditions 
existing at any one time. In addition, there may be cer­
tain industry-wide factors which have a particular effect 
on companies within that industry. Finally there are 
specific factors which are unique to an individual firm.^
Since this study is concerned with the portion of 
the weekly price relative which is the result of the 
announcement of the discretionary loss, it was necessary 
to remove the portion of the total weekly price relative 
that is related to economy-wide and industry-wide factors.
This study uses a model which has been used exten­
sively in recent empirical studies to remove the economy-
12wide effects from the individual firm's price relative.
The model was first proposed by Markowitz and later simpli-
13fied by Sharpe. The model consists of a least squares 
regression as follows:
^Benjamin F. King, "Market and Industry Factors 
in Stock Price Behavior," Journal of Business, XXXIX 
(January, 1966), 139-90.
^See Footnote 10.
13Harry H. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Effi­
cient Diversification of Investments (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1959); William S’. SEarpe, "A Simplified 
Model for Portfolio Analysis," Management Science, Vol. 9 
(January, 1963), 277-93.
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PR.. ■ a. + b.PR . + e . .it 1 1 mt it
Where:
PR^t = the logarithmic price relative of 
the i th firm's common stock at 
week t
a. and tK = estimates of parameters that relate 
changes in i th firm's common stock 
price w i t h  changes in general market 
movements
PR = a general index of market performance
expressed as a logarithmic relative 
(Standard and Poor's Industrial Price 
Index)
e. = the logarithmic price relative resid­
ual or disturbance term
Data Collection
The first step involved examining the annual report
for each of the 500 companies listed in the May, 1974#
14issue of Fortune magazine. Each report was perused# 
especially the President's letter, the income statement, 
balance sheet and footnotes, in order to detect a material 
discretionary loss which reduced income by at least 10 per­
cent before recognition of the discretionary loss. The 
reporting period of interest was from October 1, 1972, 
through September 30, 1973.^ Sixty companies were found
14Annual reports are on file in the main libraries 
of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Illinois, 
and the University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.
15Fiscal years ending September 30, 1973 were 
chosen as the cutoff date because the provisions of APB 
Opinion No. 30 were not effective until after that date;
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which m et this criteria and are the sample companies used 
in this study (Appendix A ) . For each identified company, 
certain financial and non-financial data were accumulated 
for later use in p e r f o r m i n g  statistical tests and in p r o ­
filing descriptive characteristics of the firms. An 
example of the type of data g athered for each firm is 
illustrated in A p p e n d i x  B.
In order to assess the market's reaction to the 
firm's announcement of a m a t e r i a l  discretionary loss, it 
is essential to establish the precise week when this 
information was made public. It was antic i p a t e d  that w h e n  
a discretionary loss is to be recognized, this d ecision is 
usually postponed to yea r - e n d  w h e n  the impact on total 
results is fairly well known by management. The Wall 
Street Journal Index was c onsulted for any corporate news 
item concerning the d i s cretionary l o s s . ^  If a news item 
was reported, the appropriate e d ition of The Wall Street 
Journal was ex a m i n e d  to verify the exact date when news 
of the discretionary loss was initially announced. If no 
separate news item concerning the discretionary loss was 
listed in the Index, each item listed that could remotely
most charges of  interest in this study could be found under 
the extraordinary classification on the income statement.
^^The Wall Street Journal Index (New York: Dow
Jones and C o m p a n y , I n c . ), issued m o n t h l y  with annual 
c u m u l a t i o n s .
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be concerned with earnings figures was traced to the 
appropriate edition of the Journal to determine the week 
in which the discretionary loss was first publicly dis­
closed. If the loss was not disclosed either as a separate 
news item or as part of reported earnings, the date of 
public distribution of the annual report disclosing the 
loss was used as the announcement week.
The next step involved obtaining weekly closing 
common stock prices for each of the sample companies for a 
period extending thirty-four weeks in total: twenty-nine
weeks prior to the announcement week, the week of announce­
ment and four subsequent weeks. Weekly closing values for
Standard and Poor's Industrial Price Index were also
17obtained for the necessary weeks. All data concerning 
individual security prices were available in The Daily 
Stock Price Record published quarterly by Standard and 
Poor's Corporation. Dividend information was obtained from 
Moody's Cumulative Dividend Record.
Methodology
Attention was focused on the error term e^fc to 
assess the impact of the announcement of the discretionary 
charge. Since a^ + b^PRmt represents the expected price 
relative of firm i based upon general market factors, the
17"Current Statistics," Standard and Poor's Trade 
and Securities Statistics (January, 1^74).
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error term represents the unexpected price relative of
firm i which is not attributable to general economic con­
ditions. The estimates of the parameters a^ and b^ are 
determined by least squares regression by regressing the 
weekly logarithmic price relatives for each firm on the 
weekly logarithmic price relative of the market index for 
a period of twenty-six weeks prior to the test period.
The estimated parameters for each firm in the sample are 
used to predict firm price relatives for the test period 
which encompasses the announcement week, three weeks prior 
and four weeks subsequent (weeks -3, -2, . . . +3, +4 in­
clusive) . The error term is developed by applying the 
regression equation using the ex post weekly market price 
relative to estimate the weekly price relative of firm i in 
the test period. The estimated price relative of firm i 
is then subtracted from its actual ex post price relative 
in the weeks of the test periods.
Symbolically, the error term is computed as
follows:
eit " PRit * ai - biPRmt 
Any industry-wide effects would still be present in the 
firm weekly price relative; however, this factor should 
be minor considering that the sample firms are, for the 
most part, large well-diversified companies. In addition, 
cross-sectional averaging of the weekly error terms of the 
sample firms minimized industry effects. The analysis
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focuses on the average e^t for the bath companies, thereby 
abstracting the general trend from individual firm fluc­
tuations. The computation is as follows:
n
±  I
Where:
T^T
U  * eit)
average error for week t
eit the error from the regression for firm i in week t
n
weeks in test period (-3, -2, -1, 0, 
+1, +2, +3, +4)
number of firms
Schematically, the weeks involved are depicted in Figure 2.
Non-Test Period
a * i t
Test Period
-29 -28 -27 ,.-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
Weeks from announcement
Least Squares Regres­
sion to Develop 
Estimates of
a. and b.
PR. . - a. + b. PR .it i i mt
Regression Equation Employed 
to Obtain e^t
e.f - PR.. - a - - b.PR x v it x x nit
Figure 2 
Research Time Periods
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If investors are surprised by the public announce­
ment of a material discretionary loss, we would expect a 
greater price adjustment in week 0 than in the weeks prior 
to the test period. At this point, the magnitude and not 
the direction of the price adjustment is of immediate 
interest. A transformation of e^t which abstracts from its 
sign is used to focus on the perceived informational con­
tent of the loss announcement. The transformation is the
2
square of the error term (e^t) and the magnitude of the 
price adjustment is expressed in the form of a price change 
ratio defined as follows:
lt
Where:
si
E. = the average price change ratio in period
c t (t = -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4)
2
e^t = the square of the error from the regression
for firm i in week t
2 2 s. = the average e., for firm i in the non-test
1 period*8 1
n = number of firms
The average price change ratio, Et, has an expected 
value of 1.0 and will be observed for each week in the test
18 5 T ,
s1 = ^  e^t / T, where T * number of weekly
t**i
observations for the non-test period for firm i. See 
Beaver, "The Informational Content . . p. 79.
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period for above normal or below normal price changes. An 
greater than 1.0 indicates an above normal price change 
in week t whereas an less than one indicates a below 
normal price change in week t.
HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED
If investors are surprised by the announced discre­
tionary loss and perceive this news as having informational 
content, we would expect a change in equilibrium prices to 
be reflected in an above normal price change in week 0.
The price change ratio was also observed for three weeks 
prior to week 0 in order to detect any news leakage and 
hence a market reaction before the discretionary loss is 
publicly announced. Likewise, four weeks subsequent to 
week 0 was observed to detect any lag in market reaction in 
interpreting the discretionary loss announcement.
The mean error term (et) for all 60 companies in 
the sample was observed in the week of loss announcement in 
order to measure the direction of investors' reaction. The 
expectation was that, on the average, investors will react 
unfavorably in terms of price adjustments in the week the 
discretionary loss is announced. An e^ less than 1.0 would 
indicate a negative investor response.
If investor reaction to a discretionary loss can be 
influenced by timing recognition in a period when certain 
conditions exist, we would expect a significant difference
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between the of firms where the condition is present and 
the efc of firms where the condition does not exist. The 
test conditions are the level of earnings and security 
prices relative to prior years and the presence or absence 
of extraordinary gains. The following would be expected 
in the eight-week test period:
1. The et of bath companies whose current income 
before discretionary losses is less than the net in­
come of the prior year would be significantly differ­
ent fro™ s of bath companies whose current income
2. The et of bath companies whose current average 
market price per share of common stock is less than 
the average market price per share of the grior year 
would be significantly different from the e^ of bath 
companies whose average current market price per share 
of common stock is not less than the average market 
price per share of the prior year.
3. The e^ of bath companies who recognize an 
extraordinary gain would be significantly different
~ —* w-4-u — impanies who do not recognize
In order to evaluate the results, the dual classification 
analysis of variance of the following form was utilized:
p i  i c i a L i v e  m e  x  u i i  x x x i i i
common stock in cell jk,
u * the grand mean
6 . * the effect associated with the par- 
3 ticular treatment population j,
0^  =* the effect associated with the par­
ticular treatment population k,
before onary losses is not less than the prior
year.
Where:
10R
*» the interaction effect created by the 
combination of treatments j and kf
» the random error term
= a treatment population where treatment 
is defined as the presence or absence 
of test conditions classified as 
Group I through Group VI (j = 1, 2,
... 6)
= a treatment population where treatment 
is defined as the weekly time period; 
k = -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4.1®
To summarize, three null hypotheses were tested in the eight-
week test period. The null hypotheses are stated as
follows:
1. Of those companies recognizing a discretionary 
loss (bath companies), there is no significant differ­
ence between the ex. of companies whose income before 
the discretionary loss is less than the prior year's 
net income, and the e^ of companies whose income before 
the discretionary loss is not less than the prior year's 
net income.
2. Of those companies recognizing a discretionary 
loss (bath companies), there is no significant differ­
ence between the e^ of companies whose average market 
price per share of common stock is less than the prior 
year's average market price per share, and the e^ of 
companies whose average market price per share of 
common stock is not less than the average market price 
per share in the prior year.
3. Of those companies recognizing a discretionary 
loss (bath companies), there is no significant differ­
ence between the of companies who recognize an 
extraordinary gain and the et of companies who do not 
recognize an extraordinary gain.
The financial bath reporting strategy suggests that 
there will be an investor reaction to the announcement of a 
discretionary loss but that this response can be influenced
eijk
j
*9Ya-lun Chow, Statistical Analysis (New York: Holt
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969) , p. 41b.
by postponing recognition until a period when certain 
conditions are present. In order for this experiment to 
fully support these contentions, the following result 
must occur:
Each of the three null hypotheses should be 
rejected for the eight-week test period.
Chapter 5 presents the results of the experiment described
in this chapter.
Chapter 5
RESULTS OP THE INVESTIGATION
The objective of this chapter is to report the 
results of the investigation described in the previous 
chapter. First, the question of the magnitude of investor 
reaction to the announcement of a discretionary loss will 
be ascertained and analyzed. Second, a determination 
will be made whether the evidence of a reaction, if any, 
indicates an unfavorable response. Finally, investor 
reaction to discretionary losses when six different con­
ditions are present will be tested for significance in 
determining the validity of a financial bath reporting 
strategy. In addition, a profile of the firms under 
study will be presented along with an interpretation of 
the results and their implications.
INVESTOR REACTION
The first research question addressed is whether 
or not investors are surprised by the public disclosure 
that a material discretionary loss is to be recognized.
If investors are surprised by the announcement and if the 
news imparts information such that expectations of future
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returns are altered, we would expect to observe significant 
price adjustments in the week of loss announcement (week 0). 
In order to assess the significance of the observed price 
response in week 0, the mean price response for a six-month 
period prior to the test period was used as the standard 
for comparison. A price change ratio Efc was computed for 
each of the sample companies and cross-sectionally averaged 
for each week in the test period. The result was an aver­
age price change ratio (Et) with an expected value of 1.0. 
An Efc greater than 1.0 indicates an above normal price 
change in week t. The following hypothesis was formulated:
Null hypothesis: The E. of companies recognizing
a material discretionary loss is equal to 1.0 
in the week the loss is publicly announced 
(week 0).
Alternative hypothesis: The Et of companies recog­
nizing a material discretionary loss is greater 
than 1.0 in the week the loss is publicly 
announced.
The MZ test" was employed to test the hypothesis.
If the computed Z statistic is greater than the critical 
value of 1.645 at the .05 level of significance, the null 
hypothesis should be rejected.
Efc - 1.0
Where:
E. ■ the average price change ratio in 
period t (week 0)
s - the sample standard deviation
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n = the number of sample firms 
The relevant statistics for all sample companies in the 
week of announcement (week 0) are: * 3*176; s = 5.99 5;
n * 60. The computed Z value equaled 2.812 which is 
greater than the critical value 1.645 at the .05 level of 
significance. Actually/ the Z value is significant at the 
.0025 level of significance. Consequently, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis 
that the mean price change ratio is significantly greater 
than 1.0 is accepted. This test supports the contention 
that investors are surprised by the announcement that a 
material discretionary loss is to be recognized.
Figure 3 graphically illustrates a profile of the 
mean price change ratios for the sample companies in the 
eight-week test period. This eight-week profile of investor 
response illustrates rather convincingly that the news that 
a discretionary loss is to be recognized is perceived as 
new information and has a significant influence on inves­
tors' expectations for future security returns. The pattern 
of responses indicates above-average price changes in all 
weeks in the test period relative to average price changes 
in the non-test period weeks. The mean price change ratio 
for each week is shown in Table 4.
A Z test of significance was also utilized in test­
ing the significance of the mean price responses in each of 
the three weeks prior to the loss announcement week and in
4.0
3.0
2.0
E(Et) = 1.0
=  4-7
\
\
w
2
6it
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Weeks from Announcement 
Figure 3
Magnitude of Price Change Ratios 
For All Companies
+2 +3 +4
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each of the four weeks following it. At the .05 level of 
significance, no significant difference was found between 
the mean price response in weeks -3, -2, +1, +2, and +4 
and the mean price response for the non-test period weeks.
A significant difference was found, however, in the week 
immediately prior (week -1) to the loss announcement week 
and in the third week subsequent to it (week +3).
Table 4
Mean Price Change Ratio For All 
Sample Companies in Weeks 
of the Test Period
Week Mean Price 
Change Ratio
-3 1.457
-2 1.384
-1 1.665
0 3.176
+ 1 1.195
+2 1. 794
+ 3 1.890
+ 4 1.699
The mean price response in the week of loss 
announcement is greater than in any other week, approxi­
mately 68 percent greater than the next highest price 
response (week +3). This tends to support the contention
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of the efficient markets hypothesis that when new informa­
tion becomes publicly available, the market response in 
terms of price adjustments is rapid. The above normal price 
response in week +3 is not particularly surprising and is 
likely the result of a reassessment and adjustment of the 
initial reaction in the loss announcement week. In many 
instances, the first public disclosure of management1s 
intention to recognize a material discretionary loss is 
lacking in specific details. Quite often, the announce­
ment only indicates that a decision to recognize a loss 
was reached, that it would be material (often an approxi­
mate figure was given) and that more information would be 
forthcoming. As additional information regarding the lossi
recognition becomes available, the market's initial re­
sponse to the loss announcement is likely to undergo a 
modification. Hence, the above normal response observed 
in week +3 is likely to be a modification of the initial 
response in week 0.
The above normal price response in week -1 is a 
little more difficult to interpret. One possibility is 
that there was news leakage. That is, news of the impend­
ing loss recognition may have reached the market from 
sources other than the public disclosure made in The Wall 
Street Journal. Another possibility may reflect on the 
methodology used in this study to identify the week of 
loss announcement. The Wall Street Journal Index was
1X6
examined for each company to identify the date on which 
the first public disclosure was made of the loss announce­
ment in the Journal. After the issue date was identified, 
the loss announcement week was defined as the week ending 
the subsequent Friday. For example, if the loss announce­
ment first appeared in the Wednesday, June 10, issue of 
the Journal, the loss announcement week would be identified 
as the week ending Friday, June 12. In a number of in­
stances, the date of initial announcement was reported in 
the Monday issue of the Journal; consequently, the week of 
loss announcement was identified as the week ending the 
subsequent Friday. As an example, if the loss announcement 
first appeared in the Monday, June 8, issue of the Journal, 
the week of announcement was identified as the week ending 
Friday, June 12. There is the possibility that management 
may have publicly disclosed the loss on the preceding 
Friday before the market closed, yet this news would not 
appear in The Wall Street Journal until the following 
Monday. In these instances, the loss announcement week 
would have been erroneously identified by one week.
Even though the mean price response in week -1 and 
week 0 are significantly greater than the mean price 
response in the weeks of the non-test period, the week of 
loss announcement shows by far the greater price response. 
In order to determine whether or not there was significant 
leakage of news in the weeks prior to the loss announcement
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week, a test utilizing a one-way analysis of variance 
design was implemented. The mean price responses for 
weeks -3, -2, -1 and 0 are tested for significance. If 
there was significant leakage of news in the weeks prior 
to the loss announcement week, the a priori expectation is 
that there would be no difference between the mean price 
responses for the four sample weeks. The results of the 
test appear in Table 5 and indicate that the sample differ­
ences are statistically significant at the .05 level of 
significance. The mean price response in week 0 is sig­
nificantly greater than the price response in each of the 
three prior weeks.
Table 5
Results of One-Way Analysis of Variance 
Test for News Leakage
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Mean
Square
F
Statistic
Probability of 
the F Statistic 
Occurring by 
Chance
Between
Categories 3 42.91 3.2060 .0235
Within
Categories 236
239
13.38
118
An additional Z test was performed to test the 
significance between the mean price responses in week -1 
and week 0. The test confirmed that the price response in 
the week of loss announcement was significantly greater 
than the mean price response in week **1 at the *0 35 level 
of significance. On the basis of these tests it seems 
safe to conclude that there was no significant news leakage 
or erroneous identification of the loss announcement week.
Thus far, the experiment indicates that there is a 
significant investor reaction to the announcement of a 
discretionary loss. This conclusion is based upon a 
statistically significant above-average price response in 
the week of loss announcement relative to the mean price 
response in the non-announcement weeks for the 60 companies 
in the sample. As indicated in Chapter 4, the 60 sample 
companies were sub-classified into six groups on the basis 
of six different conditions existing within the firm.
Table 6 summarizes these sub-classifications.
Although each of these firms recognized a material 
discretionary loss, the circumstances under which they were 
recognized could perhaps have a bearing on investor reaction. 
The next test measures the magnitude of the mean price 
response for each of the six sub-groups relative to the mean 
price response for the weeks in the non-test period.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show an eight-week profile of the mean 
price responses in the test period for Groups I and IX,
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Table 6
Grouping of Sample Companies on the Basis 
of the Presence or Absence of 
Test Conditions
Number of Total
Test Condition Group Companies in Number of
Each Group Companies
Income Condition:
Current year's income 
before discretionary 
losses is less than 
prior year's net income
Current year’s income 
before discretionary 
losses is greater than 
or equal to prior year's 
net income II
Price Movement Condition: 
Current year's average 
price per share of 
common stock is less 
than prior year's aver­
age price per share III
Current year's average 
price per share of 
common stock is greater 
than or equal to prior 
year's average price 
per share IV
Extraordinary Gain
Condition:
An extraordinary gain is 
recognized which par­
tially or fully offsets 
the discretionary loss V
No extraordinary gain 
is recognized VI
36
60
24
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III and IV, V and VI, respectively. The mean price change 
ratio E^, was again used to evaluate the magnitude of 
investor response in the loss announcement week relative 
to the mean price response in the six-month non-test 
period. A price change ratio of 1.0 would indicate that 
investor response in the week of loss announcement was not 
particularly unusual, being no different than the average 
response experienced throughout the preceding six months.
A price change ratio greater than 1.0 indicates an above 
average investor response and conversely for a price change 
ratio of less than 1.0. Figures 4, 5, and 6 indicate that 
regardless of the circumstances which may exist within the 
firms as characterized by the six conditions, there is an 
above average investor response for all six groups in the 
week of loss announcement. The question posited is whether 
these observed above-average responses are significantly 
greater than the mean price responses in the non-announce­
ment weeks. Partitioning the original 60 sample companies 
into six groups resulted in a small number of companies in 
certain groups. Consequently, a test for significance 
requires the use of the t distribution. Table 7 illustrates 
the results of the test for each group at the conventional 
.05 level of significance.
In five out of the six groups, the mean price 
response in the week of loss announcement is statistically 
greater than the expected mean response of 1.0 at the
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Table 7
Results of t Test Comparing the Mean Price Response 
in the Week of Loss Announcement with the Mean 
Price Response in the Weeks of the
Non-test Period
Group
Number
of
Companies
Mean Price 
Response
t
Statistic
Approximate 
Level of 
Significance
I 14 3.620 1.405 .093
II 46 3.041 2. 383 .009
III 36 3.660 2.115 .022
IV 24 2.450 2.868 .005
V 29 3.111 2.153 .021
VI 31 3.237 1.840 .040
conventional .05 level of significance. The lone excep­
tion is Group I companies which are identified as com­
panies whose current income before discretionary losses 
is less than the net income of the prior year. These 
results indicate that the announcement of a discretionary 
loss by those companies in Group I did not elicit, on the 
average, any unusual investor reaction; that is to say 
that the reaction was not significantly different from the 
average price response experienced by the firms in the 
previous six months. This finding tends to give some 
support to the aspect of a financial bath reporting 
strategy which holds that if management can exercise
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control over the timing of loss recognition, the loss 
should be recognized in a period in which results are 
adverse relative to prior periods.
It should be pointed out though that Group I 
contained only 14 observations which is the smallest 
number of companies of any of the groups. Of the 14 
companies, 8 experienced an above average price response 
in the week of loss announcement. In particular, one 
company experienced an extraordinarily large price reac- 
tion--approximately five times greater than the next 
highest price ratio. If this one extreme observation is 
excluded from the sample, the resulting t statistic 
becomes 1.840 which is greater than the critical value of 
1.782 at the .05 level of significance. Ironically, the 
initial lack of a significant difference in price response 
can be attributed to the extreme price response of one 
company which increased the variance of the sample to such 
an extent that the observed price response appeared not to 
be significantly different from 1.0.
Based upon the results of the experiment thus far, 
it can be concluded that the announcement that a material 
discretionary loss is to be recognized has informational 
content for investors. The importance of this new infor­
mation is evidenced by a rapid investor response in terms 
of a significantly greater mean price response in the week 
the loss is first publicly disclosed compared to the mean 
price response experienced by the companies in the previous
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six months of the non-test period. This conclusion was 
also found to be valid when the 60 companies were parti­
tioned into six different groups on the basis of the 
presence of six different characteristics. For each group, 
there was a significantly greater price reaction in the 
week the discretionary loss was announced compared to the 
mean price response in the other weeks of the study.
DIRECTION OF INVESTOR REACTION
In the previous section, evidence was presented 
which indicated the announcement that a discretionary loss 
will be recognized has informational content and that 
investors react to this news rapidly. However, investor 
response was measured in terms of the magnitude of price 
changes that took place in the weeks of the test period 
relative to the weeks in the non-test period. No indica­
tion of the direction of the price change was given. This 
section tests whether the announcement of a discretionary 
loss is viewed, on the average, as unfavorable news by 
investors. A downward price adjustment in the week of 
loss announcement would indicate an unfavorable investor 
response.
In order to measure investors* reaction to the 
loss announcement, attention is focused on the measure 
described in Chapter 4. efc represents the mean error for 
week t as a result of cross-sectionally averaging the
127
weekly error term from the regression for each firm in the 
sample. The measure efc has an expected value of 1.0 while 
any value less than 1.0 would indicate an unfavorable 
investor response.1
From a management perspective, the reporting of a 
discretionary loss would appear to be "bad news," that is, 
management is faced with reporting that resources under 
its stewardship have diminished without the benefit of 
creating an equivalent utility. The a priori expectation 
would appear to be a negative investor response in the week 
the discretionary loss is publicly disclosed.
By observing the treasure e^ ., for the week of loss 
announcement, the direction of investor reaction can be 
determined. Figure 7 graphically illustrates an eight-week 
profile of the direction of investor response. Week 0, the 
week of loss announcement, shows a value for e^ of less 
them 1.0 indicating a negative or unfavorable investor 
response to the loss announcement. The research question 
posited is whether this observed unfavorable investor 
response is significantly different from the expected
*The error term ej* as developed from the linear 
regression model is assumed to have an expected value of 
zero and a constant variance. The eight weeks in the test 
period were excluded in developing the regression model 
in order not to violate the linear regression model's 
assumption of homoscedasticity of variance. But in order 
to avoid working with negative figures, one was added to 
each of the residuals in the test period, thereby giving 
efc an expected value of 1.0.
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response of 1.0. The following hypothesis addresses this 
question:
Null hypothesis: The mean of the error terms (e.)
in the week of loss announcement (week 0) is 
equal to 1.0.
Alternative hypothesis: The mean of the error terms
(it)for the week of loss announcement (week 0) is 
less than 1.0.
A one-tailed *'Z test" was utilized to test if et 
for week 0 was significantly different from 1.0. If the 
computed Z value is greater than the critical value of 
-1.645 at the .05 level of significance, the null hypothe­
sis should be rejected. The mean error term for all com­
panies in the sample for week 0 is .9 82 with a sample 
standard deviation of .083. The computed Z value was 
-1.683 which is greater than the critical value of -1.645. 
Consequently, the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis that the e^ is less than 1.0 is 
accepted. On the basis of this test, it can be concluded 
that the announcement of a discretionary loss elicits a 
statistically significant negative reaction by investors.
The pattern of investor response in Figure 7 is 
particularly interesting. In the three weeks prior to the 
loss announcement, there does not appear to be any material 
unexpected price changes taking place for the sample com­
panies. This observation is consistent with the observa­
tion reported earlier that there did not appear to be any 
significant news leakage before the discretionary loss is
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announced. For the three weeks following the loss 
announcement week, investors on the average are respond­
ing favorably to the sample companies. It seems reason­
able to infer from this pattern of responses that upon the 
announcement of a discretionary loss that, on the average, 
there is an immediate downward price adjustment in the 
securities of the sample companies. After the initial 
downward price adjustment in week 0, subsequent investor 
reaction appears to reflect a new optimism as to the 
future prospects for the firms.
A Z test for significance was also applied to each 
of the other weeks in the eight-week profile. A summary 
of the results appears in Table 8. Of the eight-week test 
period, only week 0, the week of loss announcement, shows 
a significant price adjustment at the conventional .05 
level of significance.
The 60 companies making up the sample were again 
partitioned into six groups on the basis of the test condi­
tions described in Table 6. The mean error terms for each 
group in the week of loss announcement appears in Table 9.
In all the groups, the mean error term for week 0 
is less than 1.0 indicating a negative investor response. 
Therefore, regardless of the presence or absence of the 
characteristics identified by the groups, the announcement 
of a material discretionary loss is viewed unfavorably by 
investors and results in an average downward price adjust­
ment in the company's security prices.
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Table 8
Results of Z Tests for Significance of 
the Mean Error Terms for Each 
Week in Test Period
Mean Z Approximate
Week Error Statistic Level of
Term Significance
-3 .998 - .355 .361
-2 .996 - .651 .258
-1 1.002 .282 . 390
0 .982 -1.683 .047
+1 1.008 1. 353 .089
+2 1.014 1.6 30 .052
+ 3 1.003 .2 86 . 388
+4 .997 - .379 .353
aOne-tailed test.
FINANCIAL BATH REPORTING STRATEGY
The third major research question addressed in 
this experiment relates to the successful Implementation 
of a financial bath as a means of minimizing an adverse 
investor reaction to the recognition of a material discre­
tionary loss. In reviewing loss recognition under present 
generally accepted accounting principles in Chapter 2, it 
was indicated that management does appear to be able to 
exercise its discretion in recognizing certain types of
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Table 9
Mean Error Terms for Week of Loss 
Announcement by Groups
Mean Error 
Group Term in
Week 0
I .980
II .982
III .972
IV .996
V .978
VI .986
losses, especially those instances where a diminution in 
the utility of a resource precedes its actual physical 
disposition. A financial bath reporting strategy suggests 
that management should postpone recognition of material 
unfavorable events until such time as certain conditions 
exist within the firm. Allegedly, the objective of timing 
loss recognition is to minimize an expected adverse 
investor reaction.
The conditions identified in Chapter 3 as being 
conducive in implementing a financial bath are listed in 
Table 6 and are summarized below.
1. Current results are adverse - current year's 
income before discretionary losses is less than the 
net income of the previous year.
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2. Current market security price is depressed - 
current average market price per share o£ common stock 
is less than the average market price per share in the 
prior year.
3. Offsetting gain - an extraordinary gain is 
present in the current year to partially or fully 
offset the reaction to the discretionary loss.
These conditions are tested by partitioning the 60 
sample companies into six groups on the basis of the pres* 
ence or absence of the stated conditions. The mean error 
term for all the companies in each group is utilized as 
input for Z tests and a two-way analysis of variance 
design in testing for significant differences. Each null 
hypothesis is restated and the results of the tests are 
reported and analyzed separately.
Adverse Income Condition
In order to test the adverse income condition, the 
mean error term for Group I and Group II companies are 
compared for a significant difference. If a period of 
adverse results is a conducive condition for implementing 
a financial bath, we would expect to observe a lesser 
negative reaction in the Group I companies than in the 
Group II companies. This proposition is tested in the form 
of the following hypothesis.
Null hypothesis: Of those companies recognizing a
discretionary loss (bath companies), there is 
no significant difference between the et of 
companies whose income before the discretionary 
loss is less than the prior year's net income 
(Group I), and the et of companies whose income 
before the discretionary loss is not less than 
the prior year's net income (Group II).
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Alternative hypothesis: The 5^ for Group I companies
is not equal to the efc of Group II companies.
A two-tailed Z test was applied to the mean error
terms for Group I and Group II companies for week 0. The
null hypothesis should be rejected if the computed Z
statistic is greater than the critical value of 1.96 at the
.05 level of significance. The relevant statistics and
results of the test appear in Table 10.
Table 10
Results of Test for Significance Between the Mean 
Error Terms of Group I and Group II 
Companies in the Week of 
Loss Announcement
Group I Group II
Companies Companies
Mean error terms 
in week 0 .980 .982
Sample standard 
deviations .087 .082
Number of companies 14 46
Computed Z value - .075
Critical Z value -1.960
The computed Z value of -.075 is not greater than
the critical value at the chosen .05 level of significance
consequently, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected so, 
therefore, it is accepted. Based upon this test, it is 
concluded that management cannot significantly minimize
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a negative investor reaction to a discretionary loss by 
timing its recognition in a period when results are 
adverse relative to the previous year.
An eight-week profile of the mean error terms for 
Group I and Group II companies appears in Figure 8. The 
efc for both Groups is less than 1.0 for week 0 indicating 
a negative investor reaction to the announcement of the 
discretionary loss. However, it is fairly obvious that 
there is no significant difference in the efc of the two 
groups in week 0. As a matter of fact, there appears to 
be a similar pattern of investor reaction for the entire 
eight-week test period. A two-way classification analysis 
of variance test was employed to test simultaneously for 
a significant difference between the et of Group I and 
Group II companies and between the eight weeks in the test 
period. This two-way classification ANOVA design was 
specified in Chapter 4 where j was defined as the presence 
or absence of the test conditions classified as Group I 
and Group II, and k was defined as the weekly time periods 
identified as -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4. The mean 
error terms for both groups for each week is shown in 
Table 11, and the results of the ANOVA test appear in 
Table 12.
The results of the ANOVA test demonstrate that 
there is no significant difference between the e^ for 
Group I and Group II for all weeks in the test period.
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Table 11
Mean Error Terms for Group I and 
Group II Companies for Each 
Week in Test Period
Week Group I Group II
-3 .999 .997
-2 .981 1.001
-1 1.010 .999
0 .980 .982
+1 .999 1.011
+2 1.015 1.013
+ 3 1.012 1.000
+4 .987 1.000
and no significant difference between the efc in the eight- 
week period nor is there an interaction effect.
Based upon the tests performed in this section, it 
is concluded that a period of adverse results is not con­
ducive to implementing a financial bath. The alleged effect 
of minimizing a negative investor reaction is not supported 
by the empirical data gathered in this experiment.
Depressed Security Price Condition
The mean error terms for Group III and Group IV 
companies are observed to test for a significant differ­
ence in investor reaction to the announcement of a
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Table 12
Results of Two-Way Analysis of Variance Test 
of the Adverse Income Condition
Source of 
Variation
Degree
of
Freedom
Mean
Square
F
Statistic
Probability 
of the 
Statistic 
Occurring by 
Chance
Treatment 
effect j, 
income 
condition 1 0.00a .1638 .6889
Treatment 
effect k, 
weekly time 
period 7 0.00a 1.2616 .2668
Interaction 
effect jk 7 0.00a . 3985 .9032
Within 464 
4 79
“Computer rounding.
discretionary loss when the company's security prices 
are selling at different levels relative to the previous 
year. A financial bath reporting strategy suggests 
that a discretionary loss should be recognized in a period 
when the company's stock is selling at depressed levels 
relative to prior periods. If a period of depressed 
security prices is a condition conducive to implementing 
a financial bath, then we would expect to observe a lesser 
for Group III companies in week 0 than for Group IV
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companies. This proposition is tested by the following 
hypothesis:
Null hypothesis: Of those companies recognizing a
discretionary loss (bath companies), there is 
no significant difference between the et of 
companies whose average market price per share 
of common stock is less than the prior year's 
average market price per share (Group III), and 
the e^ of companies whose average market price 
per share of common stock is not less than the 
average market price per share in the prior 
year (Group IV).
Alternative hypothesis: The e^ for Group III
companies is not equal to the et of Group IV 
companies.
The results of a two-tailed Z test appears in Table 13 
with relevant statistics. The computed Z value of -1.180 
is not greater than the critical value of -1.96, therefore 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The mean error 
terms for both groups are less than 1.0 indicating an 
unfavorable investor reaction. Group III companies, whose 
security prices are at depressed levels, show a greater 
downward price adjustment in week 0 than Group IV com­
panies. This is just the opposite effect suggested by 
the financial bath reporting strategy. Yet this observed 
difference is not significantly different and could be 
attributed to chance factors; hence, no inference will be 
drawn from this result.
An eight-week profile of the mean error terms for 
Group III and Group IV companies are shown in Figure 9.
The pattern of investor response is much more diffused for 
this test condition than the adverse income test condition
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Table 13
Results of Test of Significance Between the Mean 
Error Terms of Group III and Group IV 
Companies in the Week of 
Loss Announcement
Group III 
Companies
Group IV 
Companies
Mean error terms 
in week 0 .972 .996
Sample standard 
deviations .094 .061
Number of companies 36 24
Computed Z value 
Critizal Z value
-1.180
-1.960
reported in the previous section (see Table 14). A two-way 
classification ANOVA test was employed to simultaneously 
test for a significant difference between the et for the 
two groups, for all the weeks in the test period; between 
the e^ for each of the eight weeks and if there was an 
interaction effect between the groups and weeks. The 
results are reported in Table 15.
There is no significant difference as a result of 
the j and k treatments at the conventional .05 level of 
significance. There is, however, a significant effect as 
a result of the interaction between the e^ of groups and 
weeks. Individual Z tests for each week between groups 
indicates a significant difference beteeen the et of
1.000
1.030
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Table 14
Mean Error Terms for Group III and 
Group IV Companies for Each 
Week in Test Period
Week Group III Group IV
-3 1.006 .986
-2 .996 .995
-1 .987 1.024
0 .972 .996
+1 1.008 1.008
+2 1.027 .994
+3 1.011 .991
+4 1.011 .991
Group III and Group IV companies existing in week -1 and 
+2. This significant difference can be attributed to a 
significant favorable investor response for Group IV 
companies in the week prior to the loss announcement and 
a significant favorable investor response for Group III 
companies in week +2. Since the negative investor response 
in week 0 for Group III companies is also significantly 
different from the expected response of 1.0, the signifi­
cant favorable investor response in week +2 is not par­
ticularly unusual. A likely inference is that it repre­
sents a modification of investors' initial response in
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week 0 as more information about the discretionary loss 
becomes available.
Table 15
Results of Two-Way Analysis of Variance Test 
of the Depressed Security Price Condition
Source of 
Variation
Degree
of
Freedom
Mean
Square
F
Statistic
Probability of 
the F Statistic 
Occurring by 
Chance
Treatment 
effect j, 
stock price 
condition 1 0.00a .2803 .6035
Treatment 
effect k, 
weekly time 
period 7 0.00a 1.1566 . 3259
Interaction 
effect jk 7 0.01 2.2242 .0309
Within 464
479
aComputer rounding.
The negative investor response in week 0 for 
Group IV companies is not significant at the .05 level of 
significance; consequently, the significant favorable 
investor reaction observed in week -1 is difficult to 
interpret. The only statement that can be made is that as 
a whole. Group IV companies are viewed more favorably by 
the market in the current year than in the previous year.
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In the eight-week profile, there is no significant 
negative investor reaction in any of the weeks. The 
announcement of a discretionary loss does not appear to 
significantly alter investors* expectations about future 
returns for these companies.
On the basis of the tests performed in this 
section, it is concluded that a period of depressed 
security prices is not a conducive condition in implement­
ing a financial bath. Furthermore, the evidence presented 
implies just the opposite effect; that is, a lesser nega­
tive investor reaction occurs when the company's security 
is selling at a level above what it was in the previous 
year. However, it must be remembered that the lesser 
negative response is not significant in a statistical 
sense.
Extraordinary Gain Condition
The final condition suggested by a financial bath 
reporting strategy was tested by observing the mean error 
terms for companies in Group V and Group VI in the week of 
loss announcement. Allegedly, a negative investor reaction 
to the announcement of a discretionary loss can be mini­
mized if there is also an extraordinary gain to partially 
or fully offset the loss. If this contention is valid, 
we would expect to observe a lesser efc for those companies 
classified as Group V than those classified as Group VI.
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A two-tailed Z teat at a .05 level of significance was 
employed to test the following hypothesis:
Null hypothesis: Of those companies recognizing
a discretionary loss (bath companies), there 
is no significant difference between the 5t 
of companies who recognize an extraordinary 
gain (Group V), and the et of companies who 
do not recognize an extraordinary gain 
(Group VI).
Alternative hypothesis: The et for Group V com­
panies is not equal to the et of Group VI 
companies.
The relevant statistics for the two groups of 
companies along with the results of the Z test appear in 
Table 16.
Table 16
Results of Test of Significance Between the Mean 
Error Terms of Group V and Group VI 
Companies in the Week of 
Loss Announcement
Group V 
Companies
Group VI 
Companies
Mean error terms 
in week 0 .978 .986
Sample standard 
deviations .070 .094
Number of companies 29 31
Computed Z value 
Critical Z value
- .354 
-1.960
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Both groups of companies have a mean error term of 
less than 1.0 indicating that there is a downward price 
adjustment for both groups of companies when the discre- 
tionary loss is announced. However, the computed Z value 
of -.354 is less than the critical value at the .05 level 
of significance indicating that the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected and, therefore, is accepted. Based upon the 
evidence provided by this test, a period in which an 
extraordinary gain is recognized is not a conducive condi­
tion for implementing a financial bath.
Figure 10 shows the eight-week profile for these 
two groups of companies (see Table 17 for mean error terms). 
The pattern of investor reaction is not significantly dif­
ferent in any week with week +2 being the only exception.
A two-way ANOVA test was employed to test simultaneously 
for significant differences in the mean error terms between 
groups and weeks. The results of the test appear in 
Table 18. At the chosen .05 level of significance, there 
is no significant difference between the mean error terms 
between groups, between weeks, nor is there an interaction 
effect. Although not significant at the conventional .05 
level of significance, the computed F statistic is signifi­
cant at the .0702 level of significance for the effect 
between groups. This result can be mainly attributed to a 
significantly large favorable investor response occurring 
in week +2 for Group VI companies. There is no significant
t1.040
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investor response, either favorable or unfavorable, for 
any of the three weeks prior to week 0 supporting the 
judgment that there was apparently no material news leak­
age before the loss announcement. The one significant 
favorable response in week +2 for Group VI companies can 
also be attributed to a modification of the initial nega­
tive reaction observed in week 0. Admittedly, though, 
the response seems unusually large and may very well be 
the market's reaction to other news about the companies 
in Group VI.
Table 17
Mean Error Terms for Group V and 
Group VI Companies for Each 
Week in Test Period
Week Group V Group VI
-3 .987 1.008
-2 .993 .999
-1 1.001 1.003
0 .978 .986
+1 1.007 1.009
+2 .9 89 1.037
+ 3 1.014 .992
+4 .990 1.004
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On the basis of the evidence presented in this 
section, it is concluded that the recognition of an extra­
ordinary gain concurrently with a discretionary loss does 
not on the average result in a lesser negative investor 
reaction in the week of loss announcement. Consequently, 
the extraordinary gain condition of a financial bath 
reporting strategy is not supported by this research.
Table 18
Results of Two-Way Analysis of Variance Test 
of the Extraordinary Gain Condition
Source of 
Variation
Degree 
of Mean
Freedom Square Statistic
Probability of 
the F Statistic 
Occurring by 
Chance
Treatment 
effect j, 
extraordinary 
gain condi­
tion
Treatment 
effect k, 
weekly time 
period
Interaction 
effect jk
Within
7
464
479
.01 3.2074
.01 1.4566
.01 1.6308
.0702
.1800 
.12 39
PROFILE OF STUDY
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In this section, some relevant characteristics 
of the sample companies will be reported in order to 
provide a perspective for the analysis of the results 
of this experiment. Comparisons with other studies will 
be made where appropriate.
Frequency of Discretionary 
Loss Decisions
The research methodology employed in this study 
was not specifically designed to indicate the frequency 
of discretionary loss decisions or the trend of their 
appearance in financial statements. However, the data 
gathered in this study tends not to be at variance with 
the conclusions reported in other studies which addressed 
this aspect directly. The time reference relevant to this 
project consisted of accounting year-ends from October 1, 
1972, to September 30, 1973. Forty-four of the 60 com­
panies (approximately 73 percent) recognizing discretionary 
losses had 1972 calendar year-ends. The frequency of dis­
cretionary loss recognition in this study can be roughly 
compared to the frequencies reported in two other studies.
As indicated in Chapter 3, Copeland and Moore set 
out to determine the frequency with which discretionary
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loss decisions appeared in annual reports. Based upon 
a sample of 907 companies listed on the Compustat Tapes 
for a five-year period extending from 1966 to 1970, they 
found an increasing trend in the number of companies 
recognizing discretionary losses. The range in frequen­
cies was from approximately three percent in 1966 to 
seven and one-half percent in 19 70 (see Table 2). They 
concluded that this represented an increasing financial 
reporting phenomenon. Although their data terminate with 
19 70, a straight-line projection of the trend exhibited 
in their five-year test period would project about a nine 
percent frequency rate for 1972.
In a similar endeavor, Charles Merz took a random 
sample of fifty Fortune 500 Companies in each of the six
3
years from 1967 through 1972. He also found am increasing 
trend ranging from four percent in 1967 to sixteen percent 
in 1972 (see Table 3).
In the present study, after observing five hundred 
annual reports for the period October, 1972, to September, 
19 73, 60 companies were found which recognized a material 
discretionary loss— a rate of 12 percent.
2
Ronald M. Copeland and Michael L. Moore, "The 
Financial Bathi Is It Common?" MSU Business Topics, XX 
(Autumn, 1972), 63-69.
3Charles M. Merz, "Extraordinary Losses Which Have 
Not Been Realized; Frequency of Occurrence Related to 
Other Business Factors" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Southern California, 1974).
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It should be cautioned that the above frequencies 
are not comparable. The sample companies do not extend 
precisely over the same time period nor were they drawn 
from the same population. In the light of these limita­
tions, the reader is left to evaluate the significance of 
the reported frequencies. However, it is this writer's 
personal view, based upon the data gathered in this study, 
that the practice of recognizing discretionary losses in 
annual reports is a common occurrence. Nothing was found 
which would indicate that the increasing trend documented 
in the other two studies has abated.
Effect of General Market 
Conditions
The methodology employed in this study required 
the observation of security price changes in order to 
determine investor's reaction to the announcement of a 
discretionary loss. A market model described in Chapter 4 
was utilized to remove the effects of price changes occur­
ring as a result of general economic conditions. In order 
to assess what portion of the observed price changes that 
were attributable to market-wide factors, the correlation 
coefficient and coefficient of determination was computed 
for each of the €0 companies in the six-month regression 
period (see Appendix C). On the average, approximately 13 
percent of the variation observed in security price changes 
can be explained by the variation in the market index PRmt»
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This association is rather low indicating that the results 
of the study would not have been materially different had 
attention been focused on the weekly price relative 
rather than on the error terms
Characteristics of Sample
In reviewing the annual reports of the 60 sample 
companies, several companies recognized more than one type 
of discretionary loss. A total of 83 discretionary losses 
were recognized by the sample companies. Table 19 gives 
the distribution of the types recorded.
Table 19
Discretionary Losses by Broad Category
Category
Disposal of an operating segment 34 41
Discontinuance of a product line 4 5
Inventory write-downs 2 2
Shut-down of plants, equipment
disposals 17 21
Write-down of investments 6 7
Other asset write-downs 10 12
Miscellaneous reserves,
pension and severance costs 10 12
83 100
Number Percent
154
Approximately 41 percent of the losses involved the 
estimated loss to dispose of an operating segment. Another 
21 percent concerned the estimated losses in closing down 
obsolete plants and disposal of equipment. Hence, approxi­
mately 62 percent of the discretionary losses recognized 
involved plant and equipment items. It is interesting to 
note that plant and equipment resources are quite suscep­
tible to a loss in economic utility even though their 
physical state may display no evidence of deterioration. 
Since mere observation does not always reveal a loss of 
utility, management can readily exercise its discretion 
when it might choose to write down or dispose of these 
resources.
Another interesting point relevant to the metho­
dology used in this study is the day on which the first 
public disclosure of the loss appeared in The Wall Street 
Journal. Table 20 gives a distribution of the days on 
which loss announcements were made. The Friday issue of 
the Journal contains the highest frequency of loss 
announcements which probably means that the information 
was made public by management the day before on Thursday.
A concern of this study is the number of loss announce­
ments appearing in the Monday issue. If the announcements 
were publicly made on the previous Friday before the market 
closed, the measurement of investor response in the week 
of announcement may not have been measured accurately.
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Based upon the eight-week profiles developed for the test 
period, there does not appear to be any significant inves­
tor activity in the week prior to the identified loss 
announcement week. This would tend to imply that the loss 
announcement week was not erroneously identified.
Table 20
Day on Which Loss Announcement Appeared 
in The Wall Street Journal
Day Number of 
Companies
Percent
Monday 8 13
Tuesday 10 17
Wednesday 14 23
Thursday 8 13
Friday 20 34
60 100
It was also found that fourteen of the sixty 
sample companies, or approximately 2 3 percent, announced 
the discretionary loss at the same time the annual earn­
ings were announced. Forty-six companies or 77 percent 
announced their decision to recognize a discretionary loss 
on some other date. In his study of the informational 
content of annual earnings announcements, Beaver found 
that there is a significant investor response in the week
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annual earnings are announced. There is the possibility 
that the observed investor reaction in this study for the 
14 companies who announced the discretionary loss in con­
junction with annual earnings may reflect the market's 
reaction to the annual earnings. However, it is also 
probable that investors act upon their expectations of 
future returns and that by the time annual earnings are 
reported, much of the information contained in the earnings 
announcement has already been anticipated and acted upon 
by the market. A price response in the week of earnings 
announcement is likely to be a reaction to new information 
that was not expected or anticipated. Certainly, the recog­
nition of a material discretionary loss would, in most 
instances, be difficult to anticipate, since their appear­
ance in financial statements is the result of a discretion­
ary decision.
While scanning The Wall Street Journal Index for 
the issue date of a discretionary loss announcement, any 
articles identifying a top management change was recorded. 
Nine companies or approximately 15 percent of the sample 
companies were identified as management change companies.
As mentioned earlier, a study by Michael Moore found a 
significant relationship between changes in top management
4
William H. Beaver, "The Information Content of 
Annual Earnings Announcements," Empirical Research in 
Accounting: Selected Studies. 1968. Supplement to Vol. 6,
Journal of Accounting Research, pp. 67-100.
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and the recognition of discretionary accounting decisions 
which reduced income.5 No standard for comparison was 
developed in this study to determine whether the number of 
management changes in the sample companies were any dif­
ferent from the number of management changes that take 
place in companies which did not recognize discretionary 
losses. There is no way to determine if the losses 
precipitated a change in management or vice versa.
A final characteristic noted about the sample 
companies was that 9 3 percent were audited by the "Big 
Eight" CPA firms. Table 21 indicates the distribution of 
audits by the public accounting firms for the sample 
companies.
Forty-seven companies or approximately 78 percent 
of the sample companies received an unqualified opinion 
from their auditors, whereas the opinions for thirteen 
companies or 22 percent were qualified. Most of the quali­
fied opinions were of the "subject to" variety and indicate 
that in a number of instances, there is a considerable 
amount of uncertainty about matters yet unresolved.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of the experiment reported in this 
chapter indicate that the announcement of a material
5
Michael L. Moore, "Management Changes and Discre­
tionary Accounting Decisions," Journal of Accounting Re­
search, XI, No. 1 (Spring, 19737^ 100-107.
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Table 21
Distribution of Auditing CPA Firms
CPA Firms Number of 
Companies
Percent
Arthur Andersen & Co. 12 20
Coopers & Lybrand 7 12
Ernst & Ernst 4 7
Haskin & Sells 5 8
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 13 22
Price Waterhouse & Co. 8 13
Touche, Ross & Co. 2 3
Arthur Young & Co. 5 8
Others _4
60
__7
100
discretionary loss has informational content for investors. 
The announcement elicits an above-average price adjustment 
in security prices in the week that the loss announcement 
is made. Evidence of investor reaction is reflected in a 
significantly greater mean price adjustment in the week of 
loss announcement relative to the mean price response 
experienced by the firms in a six-month period prior to 
the loss announcement. Based upon this evidence, it can 
be concluded that the announcement of a discretionary loss 
imparts new information to investors about events with real
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economic significance. This finding tends to support the 
SEC's contention in Accounting Series Release No. 138 that 
material charges as a result of discretionary management 
decisions should be identified and disclosed at the ear­
liest possible time. This study provides evidence that 
disclosure of these types of events convey information 
such that investors* expectations as to future security 
returns are significantly altered.
Another important finding of this experiment is 
that the announcement of a material discretionary loss 
results in an initial negative investor reaction. This 
reaction is evidenced by a significant downward price 
adjustment in the security prices of firms in the week 
of loss disclosure. This reaction confirms management's 
suspicion that the announcement that there has been a 
diminution in the company's resources without creating an 
equivalent utility, is viewed as "bad news" by investors 
and reflects unfavorably upon their stewardship and admin­
istration. This could very well be the basis for the 
apparent attempt by management to manipulate reported 
income by timing the release of bad news in a period when 
certain conditions are present. The rationale is that 
release of the bad news when these conditions are present 
will in some way obscure or reduce an expected negative 
investor reaction. That management does in fact exhibit 
this type of behavior is supported by the other research
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studies reviewed in this paper. A major question left 
unresolved is whether or not management is successful in 
employing a loss timing strategy to minimize an expected 
adverse investor reaction. Three conditions which 
allegedly should be present in order to minimize an 
adverse investor reaction to a loss announcement were 
tested in this research. They included (1) an adverse 
income condition, (2) depressed stock price condition, 
and (3) an extraordinary gain condition.
The following null hypothesis was tested: For
companies recognizing material discretionary losses, there 
is no significant difference in investor reaction between 
those companies where the condition was present and those 
companies where the condition was not present. For each 
one of the above three conditions, the null hypothesis 
could not be rejected at the .05 level of significance.
On the basis of this evidence, it can be concluded 
that even though management may think that a negative 
investor reaction to a discretionary loss can be minimized 
when certain conditions are present, the empirical evi­
dence of investor reaction developed in this study does 
not support this effect. The many references to the 
"financial bath” in the financial literature and their 
implications that management is somehow "fooling" or mis­
leading investors appears to be a myth and not supported 
by fact.
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The results of this experiment are entirely con­
sistent with the efficient markets hypothesis. The 
announcement of a discretionary loss is perceived by the 
market as an event of real economic substance; conse­
quently, significant price adjustments were observed in 
the week the loss was disclosed. Investor reaction was 
rapid and negative. But timing the release of the loss 
announcement when certain conditions were present did not 
significantly influence investor reaction.
Chapter 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This research project had two principal but 
mutually supportive thrusts. First, the conceptual 
nature of an accounting loss under contemporary gener­
ally accepted accounting principles was determined.
This initial phase was prerequisite to an evaluation 
of the feasibility of alleged abuses ascribed to this 
area of accounting practice. Second, an empirical 
investigation was undertaken to measure investor 
reaction to the announcement of a material discretionary 
loss. The evidence gathered in this empirical phase was 
used to evaluate the effects of a financial reporting 
activity identified as a financial bath. A financial 
bath was characterized as the sudden appearance of a large 
material loss in an entity's current income statement 
which did not readily appear to be the result of events 
that had taken place in the current period.
This concluding chapter restates the problem that 
the research specifically addressed. The research metho­
dology employed is reviewed along with a summary of the 
major findings. Finally, the results will be interpreted
162
163
and conclusions reached have complementary implications for 
both the fields of accounting and finance. Recommendations 
as to future research extensions in this area are also 
discussed.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In recent years, financial analysts, the financial 
press, and others have directed criticism toward companies 
which allegedly engage in a financial reporting practice 
known as a financial bath. The inference is that these 
firms are engaged in some form of deceptive reporting prac­
tice which could mislead investors and others who have an 
interest in the economic affairs of the firms. Since a 
financial bath is implemented through the medium of 
accounting financial statements, there is the implication 
that there is a deficiency in the accounting practices 
employed by these firms. Conceivably, this could be the 
result of a lack of guidance provided by generally accepted 
accounting principles, or perhaps it reflects the oppor­
tunistic interpretation of existing guidelines.
Research into the financial bath phenomenon is not 
extensive, yet there is ample reference to it in explaining 
certain firm behavior. A review of the financial litera­
ture indicates that references to financial bath activity 
and its consequences are often based upon conclusions 
reached as a result of a limited number of observations
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without any organized research effort to empirically 
support the allegations. Unless evidence is provided to 
support these allegations/ the inferences as to conse­
quences along with the implied deficiencies in accounting 
practices reflect only the individual author's personal 
opinion that a problem may exist. A problem would seem 
to exist if it can be shown that this activity occurs 
frequently and is not just a manifestation of abnormal 
reporting by a few isolated firms.
Two substantial research studies reviewed in this 
paper tend to give credence to the notion that the finan­
cial bath is a financial reporting problem and that it is 
becoming more widespread. In particular/ the joint study 
of Ronald Copeland and Michael Moore, and another study by 
Charles Merz provided "hard" evidence that firms do indeed 
take financial baths. Copeland and Moore found a frequency 
rate of financial bath activity which ranged from three per­
cent to seven and one-half percent over a five-year period 
extending from 1966 to 1970. Charles Merz, utilizing a 
smaller sample, found a frequency rate ranging from four 
percent to eighteen percent over a six-year period extend­
ing from 1967 to 1972. Both studies attributed the bath 
activity observed, at least in part, to deficiencies in 
current accounting practice in the area of loss recogni­
tion. In addition, both studies tested whether there is 
a relationship between financial bath activity and certain 
characteristics or conditions which may exist in the firm.
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In the casual references to financial bath activity, it is 
often suggested that management appears to time loss recog­
nition in a period when certain conditions are present. In 
summary, the conditions most frequently mentioned are:
1. Adverse income condition - current year’s 
income before the material loss is less than the 
net income of the previous year.
2. Depressed security price condition - current 
average market price per share of common stock is 
less than the average market price per share in the 
prior year.
3. Extraordinary gain condition - an extra- 
ordinary gain is present in the current year to 
partially or fully offset the material loss.
In the Merz study, a statistically significant 
relationship was found between bath activity and both the 
adverse income condition and extraordinary gain condition. 
Copeland and Moore also found a statistically significant 
relationship between bath activity and the adverse income 
condition, and, although they tested the security price 
condition, their results proved inconclusive with respect 
to this condition.
The fact that a statistical relationship has been 
found between bath type behavior and the existence of 
certain conditions implies that management perceives these 
conditions as being conducive in implementing a financial 
bath. A thorough analysis of the comments of analysts, 
financial executives, and critics of the financial bath 
phenomenon strongly suggests that bath activity is often 
a deliberate reporting strategy employed by management to
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minimize a perceived negative reaction by investors to the 
news that a material loss has been suffered. In other 
words, management is faced with reporting a loss of re­
sources under its stewardship to investors who have an 
interest in those resources. Consequently, the reporting 
of such news would be perceived by management as an undesir­
able situation reflecting unfavorably upon their administra­
tion. It is not inconceivable that if management could 
exercise discretion when the resource diminution can be 
recognized, they would make an effort to release the news 
in a period they perceive would cause the least negative 
investor response. Apparently, the conditions of adverse 
income or depressed security prices relative to prior 
years and the presence of an extraordinary gain are per­
ceived by management as conditions whose existence are 
conducive in minimizing an expected adverse investor 
reaction to a material loss.
Whether or not investors do react to news of a 
material loss and if a reaction is different when certain 
conditions are present is subject to empirical verifica­
tion and was a primary point of investigation in this 
study. Preliminary to this determination, however, a 
thorough analysis of the nature of an accounting loss was 
necessary to provide an accounting perspective by which 
the feasibility and propriety of financial bath activity 
can be evaluated.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research plan followed in this project 
included both a descriptive and empirical phase. The 
descriptive phase was necessary to establish the account- 
ing concept of a loss under generally accepted accounting 
principles as it is presently interpreted in contemporary 
practice. The empirical phase required the gathering of 
evidence regarding the effects of financial bath activity 
for the purpose of a definitive statement or description 
of the actual effects. As indicated previously, many of 
the references to the effects of financial bath activity 
were not supported by evidence gathered in an organized 
research effort, but merely reflect the alleged effects 
perceived by the authors' observation of a limited 
number of cases.
Descriptive Phase
The initial procedure followed in describing the 
nature of an accounting loss was to undertake a thorough 
search of the accounting literature for references to the 
symbol "loss." The publications of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, the American Accounting 
Association, accounting textbooks, and articles by noted 
accounting scholars proved particularly useful in identi­
fying the referents of this accounting term. Following 
this process of identification, a comparative analysis
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was undertaken with similarities and points of divergence 
being noted.
Next a step-by-step procedure was followed in 
developing the meaning of the term loss from its most 
conanon generalized usage to its specific usage as a tech­
nical term in the field of accounting. Following its 
separate conceptual identification, the operational proce­
dures concerning loss recognition, valuation, and classifi­
cation was discussed within the existing accounting model.
Describing the conceptual nature of an accounting 
loss was necessary as a basis for assessing whether the 
implementation of a financial bath through loss recognition 
was feasible and within the scope of the broad limits 
established by generally accepted accounting practices.
The results of this descriptive phase are reported in
the summary of findings section of this chapter.
Empirical Phase
Evidence of the effects of a financial bath was
obtained in the empirical phase of this research by
measuring the reaction of investors to the announcement 
that a material loss was to be recognized. In order to 
limit the scope of this study, attention was focused on 
those losses which were identified as discretionary, 
that is, a loss in economic resources which had not been 
evidenced by an exchange transaction with an outside 
party and whose recognition depended primarily on a
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managerial decision. In the judgment of this writer, this 
type of loss would be most susceptible to the timing 
requirements in the implementation of a financial bath.
Investor reaction to the announcement of a discre­
tionary loss was measured by observing changes in security 
price returns at the time of the first public disclosure 
by a firm that a discretionary loss was to be recognized.
A substantial body of research in portfolio theory indi­
cates that the market is efficient in processing new infor­
mation and will react rapidly to all publicly available 
information. The reaction takes the form of changes in the 
equilibrium price of a security as a result of a change in 
the market's assessment of future returns for that security. 
Therefore, if the announcement of a discretionary loss has 
informational content for investors, their assessment of 
this news can be observed in the changes that take place 
in the firm's security price. A security weekly rate of 
return was computed by the following formula:
PRit « In Dit + Pit P1"it-1
A security's weekly return can be affected by a 
number of factors. The state of the economy and general 
economic conditions can influence the return on a security. 
In addition there may be certain industry-wide factors 
exerting an influence on those companies in that industry. 
Finally, there are factors unique to a specific firm which
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affects Its return. Since this study was concerned with
the portion of the weekly rate of return which is the
result of the announcement of the discretionary loss, it
was necessary to remove the return that was attributable
to economy-wide and industry-wide factors. In order to
accomplish this, economy-wide factors were removed by
employing a simplified market model which linearly relates
the return on individual securities (pp^t) to a market
return (PR as reflected in Standard and Poor's Indus- mt .
trial Price Index of 425 industrial companies. Symbolic­
ally, the model utilized is as follows:
PRit - 8i + biPRnt + eit
No special procedures were employed to remove industry­
wide factors other than cross-sectionally averaging 
because the sample firms were, for the most part, large, 
well-diversified firms and it did not appear that any one 
industry would materially bias the results of this study.
Sampling plan and data collection. Each annual report 
for the 500 companies listed in the May, 1974, issue of 
Fortune magazine was examined for the recognition of a 
discretionary loss which reduced income before the loss 
by 10 percent or more. Sixty companies were found which 
met this criterion indicating a 12 percent frequency rate. 
Following this, The Wall Street Journal Index was examined 
for the first public disclosure in The Wall Street Journal 
of the discretionary loss for each of the 60 sample
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companies. The appropriate edition of the Journal was 
consulted to verify the exact date of public disclosure.
The week ending Friday that included the loss announcement 
was identified as the announcement week (week 0). The 
next step involved obtaining weekly closing common stock 
prices for each of the sample companies for a period of 
34 weeks. Weekly closing values for Standard and Poor's 
Industrial Price Index were also obtained for the necessary 
weeks.
Methodology. In the market model the terms ai + biPRmt 
represent the expected return based upon general economic 
conditions affecting all securities. The error term e^t 
represents the unexpected return that cam be attributed to 
those factors unique to the firm. Estimates of the parame­
ters a^ and b^ were obtained by regressing the weekly 
logarithmic price return for each firm on the weekly loga­
rithmic price return of the market index for a period of 26 
weeks prior to the test period. The test period consisted 
of an eight-week period surrounding the loss announcement 
week (week -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4).
The estimated parameters for each firm was used 
to predict each firm's return in each week of the test 
period. The estimated security return of each firm was 
then subtracted from its actual ex post return in the 
weeks of the test period in order to arrive at the error 
term. Symbolically, the error term was computed as:
The error terms for each company were cross-sectionally 
averaged in order to arrive at a mean error term for all 
companies in each of the eight-week test periods.
Attention was focused on the mean error term to assess the 
impact of the announcement of the discretionary loss.
Hypotheses tested. The first test concerned the magnitude 
of investor reaction in the week the loss was announced.
If the loss announcement had informational content, we 
would expect a greater price adjustment in week 0 than in 
the weeks prior to the test period. A transformation of 
the error terms was used in order to assess the magnitude 
of investor reaction without regard to direction. A mean 
price change ratio (Efc) was computed as follows:
a value greater than 1.0 indicating an above normal price 
change and a value of less than 1.0 indicating a below 
normal price change in week t. The following hypothesis 
was formulated:
n
n 2
The computed had an expected value of 1.0 with
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Null hypothesis: The Et of companies recognizing
a material discretionary loss is equal to 1.0 
in the week the loss is publicly announced 
(week 0).
Alternative hypothesis: The of companies recog­
nizing a material discretionary loss is greater 
than 1.0 in the week the loss is publicly 
announced.
If the null hypothesis was accepted, this would indicate 
that the announcement of a discretionary loss on the 
average did not possess informational content for investors 
such that expectations for future returns were altered. If 
the null hypothesis was rejected, it would indicate that the 
loss announcement elicited a significantly greater price 
response in the week of loss announcement than the mean 
price response experienced by the firms in a six-month 
period preceding the test period.
The next test was concerned with whether the 
announcement of a discretionary loss was perceived by 
investors as "bad news." Evidence of an adverse reaction 
would be provided by a downward price adjustment in the 
securities of the firms in the week of loss announcement. 
Attention was focused on the mean error term (efc) which 
had an expected value of 1.0. An efc less than 1.0 would 
indicate a downward price adjustment and an unfavorable 
investor reaction. The following hypothesis was formulated:
Null hypothesis: The mean of the error terms (et)
in the week of loss announcement (week 0} is 
equal to 1.0.
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Alternative hypothesis: The mean of the error terms
(e^) for the week of loss announcement (week 0) 
is less than 1.0.
If the null hypothesis was accepted, this would indicate 
that investors did not react to the announcement of the 
loss. If the null hypothesis was rejected, it would indi­
cate that on the average investors do perceive the loss 
announcement as unfavorable news and react negatively by 
adjusting downward the security prices of the firms.
The final test performed in this experiment was to 
test whether investor reaction as measured by the mean 
error terms was different when certain conditions were 
present. The 60 sample companies were partitioned into 
six groups on the basis of the presence or absence of the 
test conditions. The conditions tested, group identifica­
tion and number of companies are summarized in Table 22.
The following null hypotheses were formulated in 
order to test these conditions.
Adverse income condition
Null hypothesis: Of those companies recognizing a
discretionary loss (bath companies), there is 
no significant difference between the §t of 
companies whose income before the discretionary 
loss is less than the prior year's net income 
(Group I), and the et of companies whose income 
before the discretionary loss is not less than 
the prior year's net income (Group II).
Alternative hypothesis* _The efc for Group I companies 
is not equal to the efc of Group II companies.
Table 22
Identification of Test Conditions
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Condition Present Condition Absent
Condition
Number 
Group of
Companies
Number 
Group of
Companies
Adverse income 
condi tion I 14 II 46
Depressed security
price condition III 36 IV 24
Extraordinary gain V
condition
29 VI 31
Depressed security price condition
Null hypothesis: Of those companies recognizing a
discretionary loss (bath companies), there is 
no significant difference between the e^ of 
companies whose average market value per share 
of common stock is less than the prior year's 
average market price per share (Group III), 
and the et of companies whose average market 
price per share of common stock is not less 
than the average market price per share in 
the prior year (Group IV).
Alternative hypothesis: The e^ for Group III com­
panies is not equal to the e. of Group IV 
companies.
Null hypothesis: Of those companies recognizing a
discretionary loss (bath companies) there is no 
significant difference between the 8t of com­
panies who recognize an extraordinary gain 
(Group V), the the 8* of companies who do not 
recognize an extraordinary gain (Group VI).
Alternative hypothesis: The e^ for Group V com­
panies is not equal to the 5. of Group VI 
companies.
Extraordinary gain condition
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In order for this experiment to fully support the 
contention that investor reaction can be influenced by 
timing the loss announcement in a period when certain 
conditions are present, all of the above null hypotheses 
should be rejected. If the null hypotheses are accepted, 
this would indicate that there is no substance to the 
allegations of the effects of a financial bath. The 
following section summarizes the results of this experi­
ment and assesses their implications.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
A search of the accounting literature in an effort 
to develop the concept of an accounting loss revealed that, 
although the term is frequently used in practice, it is 
not well-defined in the literature. The most often encoun­
tered references to losses dwell on the manner in which 
losses are measured and expressed in accounting rather than 
on the process or event which caused the measurement to be 
made. Another serious problem encountered concerned the 
widespread indiscriminate use of the symbol loss, which in 
many instances appeared to overlap in mewing with the 
accounting symbol expense. In some context, the symbols 
loss and expense are used interchangeably even though 
conceptually they represent markedly different underlying 
events.
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In analyzing the constitutive nature of an account­
ing loss, the following definition was formulated which 
most closely incorporates the nature of a loss as it is 
found in a financial accounting context.
A loss is a diminution or disappearance of 
enterprise economic resources which results from 
unsuccessful business activity. The circumstances 
under which this occurrence takes place is when 
enterprise economic resources are expended or 
disappear without creating an equivalent utility.
A loss is measured and expressed in the same manner 
that economic resources are measured and expressed. Con­
ventional accounting practice requires that the acquisition 
of an economic resource is properly measured and expressed 
in terms of the number of dollars paid (historical cost) 
or the dollar equivalent of other resources given in ex­
change. Acquisition cost is assigned proportionately to 
the attribute or characteristic of the resource which is 
perceived as having utility. A diminution in the attribute 
or characteristic is expressed as a proportionate decrease 
in number of acquisition dollars. If a diminution does not 
result in the creation of an equivalent utility, then the 
dollar reduction is the accounting measure and expression 
of the loss.
Conceptually, a loss should be recognized in the 
same period as the diminution in the resources takes place. 
To the extent this is accomplished, useful relationships 
may be established between events and environmental condi­
tions existing at a particular time and their impact on
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the economic resources of the entity. Attainment of the 
theoretical ideal is often difficult in practice because 
of the nature of some resource diminishments. Resource 
diminutions which are the result of a numerical reduction 
of the quantitative units of a resource do not usually 
present recognition problems. However, those which are 
the result of a partial or complete impairment in the 
utility of a resource are much more difficult to ascertain. 
In many instances, the resource is still physically pres­
ent in its quantitative state even though it has lost its 
ability to generate a resource inflow equivalent to the 
resources expended in its acquisition. In these instances, 
their accounting recognition is often dependent upon a 
managerial decision that a loss exists. It is entirely 
feasible that management may choose, for one reason or 
another, to postpone this decision. And it is this type 
of situation where allegations of timing loss recognition 
usually occur.
The classification of losses as well as other items 
on the income statement are grouped in a manner which tends 
to emphasize the nature and frequency with which events 
occur. Losses, as a separate category, do not generally 
appear on income statements; consequently, loss items are 
usually found in the extraordinary category or disposal 
of a segment category.
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The empirical phase of this project addressed 
three specific points:
1. Do investors react to the announcement of 
a discretionary loss?
2. Is the announcement of a discretionary loss 
perceived by investors as "bad news" thereby 
eliciting a negative reaction?
3. Can investor reaction be influenced by timing
the loss announcement in a period when certain con­
ditions are present?
The first statistical hypothesis of this study 
tested investor reaction by comparing the mean price
response in the week of loss announcement with the mean
price response experienced by the firms in a six-month 
period prior to the test period. Utilizing a "Z test," 
the computed Z value was 2.812 which is greater than the 
critical value of 1.645 at the .05 level of significance. 
This result requires the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference between the mean price responses 
be rejected. From this, it can be concluded that the 
announcement of a discretionary loss is perceived by 
investors as an event of real economic significance. The 
importance of this new information is evidenced by a rapid 
investor response in terms of a significantly greater mean 
price response in the week the loss is first publicly dis­
closed compared to the mean price response experienced by 
the companies in the previous six months of the non-test 
period. This test indicates that there is a significant 
investor reaction to the announcement of a discretionary
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loss; however, the test focused attention on the magnitude 
rather than the direction of the investor price response.
The second statistical hypothesis of this study 
tested whether the announcement of a discretionary loss 
was perceived by investors as "bad news." If so, the 
expectation would be a significantly negative investor 
response as measured by the mean error term in the week of 
loss announcement. The mean error term (©t) has an ex­
pected value of 1.0 with values less than 1.0 indicating 
a downward price adjustment in the securities of companies 
announcing a material discretionary loss. A one-tailed Z 
test was utilized to test if efc for week 0 was signifi­
cantly less than 1.0. The computed Z value was -1.6 83 at 
the ,05 level of significance; consequently, the null 
hypothesis was rejected. The alternative hypothesis that 
the mean error term is less than 1.0 was accepted. On the 
basis of this test, it cam be concluded that the announce­
ment of a discretionary loss is perceived by investors as 
"bad news" and elicits an immediate downward security price 
adjustment in the week the loss is announced.
The final test performed in this study concerned 
whether or not the timing of the discretionary loss 
announcement in a period when certain conditions are pres­
ent could influence investor response to the loss announce­
ment. Statistical hypothesis for three conditions were 
formulated: (1) an adverse income condition, (2) depressed
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security price condition, and (3) an extraordinary gain 
condition. For each of these conditions, the null 
hypothesis that there is no significant difference in 
investor reaction between those companies where the con-* 
dition was present and those companies where the condition 
was not present could not be rejected at the .05 level of 
significance. On the basis of this evidence, it can be 
concluded that investor reaction to the announcement of a 
discretionary loss cannot be significantly influenced by 
timing the announcement in a period when any one of the 
test conditions are present.
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings of this study focus attention on 
several important aspects of contemporary accounting prac­
tice, management psychology, and investor reaction to 
accounting data. Consequently, the evidence presented in 
this study has implication for both the fields of account­
ing and finance. From an accounting perspective, it con­
tributes to a better understanding of a long neglected 
area of accounting practice. An awareness of weaknesses 
and abuses in an area is a necessary prerequisite for 
improvement. This study also contributes to the discipline 
of finance by providing an insight into certain management 
behavior in reporting losses to the investment community. 
Also evidence of how the market reacts to loss announcements
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lends support to the efficiency of the market In evaluating 
new information. The remainder of this chapter will dis­
cuss the implications of the results of this study and 
recommendation for improvements will be made where appro­
priate.
Accounting Implications
The investigation of the nature of an accounting 
loss revealed several areas where problems already exist 
or circumstances are such that problems could develop if 
corrective action is not initiated. Some of these problem 
areas and potential problem areas are pointed out in the 
following analysis.
A concern, perhaps not of immediate urgency, yet 
of major long-run significance, is the apparent and fre­
quent indiscriminate use of the symbol "loss" in contexts 
where other accounting symbols would be more appropriate 
in describing the underlying events of interest. Specifi­
cally, the problem of employing the accounting symbols 
expense and loss interchangeably to describe a particular 
event is neither conceptually accurate nor practically 
desirable. Careless use of a symbol in inappropriate 
situations can only serve to confuse recipients of the 
communication and propagate a further misuse of terms. 
Furthermore, it represents an undesirable condition for 
a discipline which seeks to efficiently communicate complex 
economic events through technical symbols.
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The measurement of am accounting loss was analyzed 
within the context of contemporary practice. Consequently, 
an accounting loss was measured and found its expression 
in terms of a quantity of acquisition dollars, that is, 
the historical dollars assigned initially to the attribute 
of the resources perceived as having utility when acquired. 
Measurement of losses under other valuation bases other 
than historical cost were beyond the scope of this study.
The area examined which exhibited the most per­
plexing problems from an accounting standpoint is the 
area of loss recognition. Conceptually, a loss should be 
recognized when incurred, yet practically this recommenda­
tion is often difficult to implement. Those losses which 
are the result of a diminution of the numerical quantity 
of a resource usually do not present recognition problems. 
The evidence to substantiate a loss is apparent and con­
vincing. However, those losses which are the result of a 
partial or complete impairment in the utility of a resource 
are not as apparent; hence recognition may not always take 
place in the same period that the diminution takes place.
It is in these circumstances that current practice dictates 
that the loss be recognized when ascertained. And herein 
lies the most serious problem in terms of providing an 
environment susceptable to abuse. If management, for what­
ever reason, chooses to postpone making the ascertainment 
that a loss exists, their action will not always be apparent
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because often the resource Is physically present In its 
quantitative capacity, yet it has lost its utility or 
ability to generate a resource inflow. The SEC apparently 
recognized this potential for abuse in their initial ex­
posure draft of a proposed Accounting Series Release
requiring greater disclosure of unusual charges and credits 
1
to income. The Commission expressed concern that many of 
these large charges appearing in the current period did not 
appear to be the result of events occurring in that period. 
As a result, the Commission proposed, among other disclos­
ure requirements, that pro forma statements of income for 
the past five fiscal years be prepared reflecting an allo­
cation of these material charges to these prior periods on 
the basis of facts known at the date of filing. In other 
words, with hindsight, management would be required to 
indicate in what periods the resource diminution actually 
took place even though the loss was being recognized all 
at one time in the current period. Correspondence with 
Hr. John C. Burton, SEC Chief Accountant, regarding the 
comment letters received on this proposed amendment 
revealed the following:
The greatest number of comments made related 
to the proposed requirement for pro forma state­
ments of operations for the past five years
^Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities 
Act Release No. 5313 and Securities Exchange Act Release 
Ho. 9601'; October ?, 19721----------------- 3--------------
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reflecting the allocation of material charges to 
these prior periods. Virtually every comment 
suggested elimination of this requirement.2
Apparently, the opposition to this requirement was
convincing and, as a result, a substantially "watered down"
version of this amendment was finally issued by the Com-
3
mission as Accounting Series Release No. 138. The five- 
year pro forma restatement was eliminated.
The time horizon proposed by the Commission for 
the reporting of this five-year restatement seemed a bit 
unreasonable (ten days) considering the magnitude and 
extent of some of the material charges being recognized. 
However, a similar requirement for annual reports, in the 
opinion of this writer, would appear to have considerable 
merit. Management would have sufficient time to assess 
the significance of prior events on the diminution of 
resources currently ascertained. With the benefit of 
hindsight, a reasonable allocation of charges that actually 
occurred in prior periods can be made for pro forma 
restatements.
This is not to suggest that such an allocation will 
directly improve the interpretation of the loss disclosure. 
The evidence developed in this study indicates that the
2
Based on personal correspondence between Mr.
John C. Burton, SEC Chief Accountant, and the writer, 
October 22, 19 74.
^Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting 
Series Release No. 138, January 12, 1973, 38 FTTT! 2446.
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market is efficient in processing the significance of 
available information as long as disclosure is adequate. 
However, a pro forma restatement of prior years' income 
could have important psychological effects which indirectly 
could improve financial reporting in this area. In 
instances where management consciously postpones recogni­
tion of the impact of adverse events until a period when 
certain conditions are present, the motivation for such 
action often lies in management's perception of some 
benefit to be derived. Firstly, management is able to 
report greater earnings in those periods where losses have 
occurred but are unrecognized. Secondly, a lesser negative 
investor response is anticipated if all the bad news is 
released at one time especially if reported when certain 
other conditions are present. Regarding the second aspect, 
the evidence provided in this experiment does not support 
the effect of a lesser negative reaction when certain 
conditions are present* If management were required to 
prepare a pro forma restatement of prior income for losses 
ascertained in the current period but relating to diminu­
tions in prior periods, it would appear that the perceived 
benefits of postponing loss recognition would be eliminated. 
In addition, calling attention to losses unreported in 
prior periods would perhaps make management more aware of 
the potential legal ramifications if the non-recognition 
appeared to be deliberate.
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The Financial Accounting Standards Board has
currently under study a broad project concerning the con-
4
ceptual framework for accounting and reporting. The
AICPA appointed a special group which studied and reported
their findings concerning the objectives of financial 
5
statements. The solution to many current problems in 
accounting would be facilitated if the objectives of 
financial reporting could achieve some consensus. Those 
accounting procedures and practices that would be pre­
ferred are those which best accomplish the stated objec­
tives. Classification of items on the income statement is 
a good case in point. Classification schemes are meaning­
ful and informative if they serve the purpose they were 
designed for. Until such time as the purpose or objective 
of income reporting is agreed upon, classification of items 
on the income statement will continue to overlap in an 
attempt to serve a variety of non-specified purposes. The 
point is well-illustrated by the long-standing struggle of 
the Accounting Principles Board to determine what should 
or should not be included on the income statement, what
4
Financial Accounting standards Board, "Conceptual 
Framework for Accounting and Reporting: Consideration of
the Report of the Study Group on the Objectives of Finan­
cial Statements," FASB Discussion Memorandum, June 6, 1974.
5
Study Group on the Objectives of Financial State­
ments, Objectives of Financial Statements (New York: Ameri­
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973), p. 13.
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items are or are not extraordinary, what is or is not a 
segment of a business, what item should or should not be 
disclosed separately. Losses are not meaningfully classi­
fied on the income statement. It would appear that losses 
of a discretionary nature should be separately identified. 
Readers of the statement should be made aware that the 
loss item could perhaps have been recognized in a prior 
year or in a subsequent year, but the fact that it appears 
in the current year is the result of a management decision 
to recognize it. This need was recognized by the Objec­
tives Study Group when discussing desirable features of 
financial statementss
Each of the financial statements should be 
structured to enhance the user's ability to 
assess the following: . . . The extent to which 
the occurrence of sacrifices and benefits or 
their allocation to time periods, is discretion­
ary or arbitrary. Examples are contributions, 
unusual research expenditures, or the recognition 
of gains or losses whose timing can be controlled.
Implications for Management
The data developed in this study regarding investor 
reaction to loss announcements confirm management's 
suspicion that the loss announcement is viewed as "bad 
news" by investors and may reflect unfavorably upon their 
stewardship and administration. Consequently, if manage­
ment believes that implementing a financial bath when
g
Objectives of Financial Statements, p. 39.
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certain conditions are present would somehow mitigate or 
minimize an expected negative investor reaction, it would 
be in their self-interest to implement it when the condi­
tions are right. Discussions of financial bath activity 
in the financial literature indicate that an attempt to 
minimize an adverse investor reaction may very well be 
the basis for the observed bath activity. Even though 
management may think this effect will occur, the evidence 
developed in this study indicates that the rationale for 
implementing a bath reflects more of a "hoped for" effect 
rather than an "actual" effect. The measurement of 
investor reaction to the announcement of a discretionary 
loss was not significantly different in those companies 
where the conditions were present and those companies 
where the conditions did not exist. Consequently, 
investor reaction cannot be influenced by timing loss 
recognition and, hence, there is no advantage or benefit 
in following this practice. Management should be made 
aware that the market is efficient in processing informa­
tion about events that have a real economic effect on the 
company's expected future returns. Practices such as 
timing the loss announcement when other conditions are 
present do not represent events of real economic signifi­
cance and, hence, are ignored by the market.
Implications for Finance
The findings of this study are fully in accord with 
and lend support to the efficient markets hypothesis. The 
announcement that there has been a diminution in an entity's 
resources without creating an equivalent utility was 
viewed by the market as news of an event with real economic 
significance. Consequently, the announcement of a discre­
tionary loss elicited a significant investor reaction as 
evidenced by above-average security price changes in the 
week the loss was disclosed. Investor reaction was rapid 
and negative. Events and practices which have no bearing 
on a company's ability to earn a future return should be 
ignored by the market. This expectation was borne out by 
this research when it was shown that the market was not 
influenced by timing the loss in a period when certain 
extraneous conditions were present.
The methodology employed in this study seems 
particularly appropriate for testing the alleged effects 
or consequences of certain accounting practices and proce­
dures. It is not unusual for authoritative bodies such 
as the Financial Accounting Standards Board, when hearing 
arguments in favor of or in opposition to a particular 
practice under consideration, to hear allegations that a 
certain pronouncement would have an adverse effect on the 
market price of the securities of the firms involved.
This methodology can be utilized to substantiate the
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alleged effects thereby providing evidence that can be used 
as basis for evaluating the merits of the arguments.
The 60 companies analyzed in this study were drawn 
from those listed in the 1974 Fortune 500. While the 
Fortune 500 companies do not represent a random selection 
of business firms, from an accounting standpoint, they 
are probably the most important single group of companies 
to consider. As a group, they have a substantial impact 
on the entire U.S. economy in terms of contribution to 
gross national product, utilization of the nation's re­
sources, and the employment of a labor force. Consequently, 
their activities are closely monitored by all sectors of 
the economy and are subject to public scrutiny. While the 
results and analysis developed in this study cannot be 
validly generalized beyond the Fortune 500 companies, it 
is important to note that the accounting and reporting 
practices employed by these firms tend to mirror contem­
porary practice and would be quite influential in estab­
lishing the acceptability of any new accounting or 
reporting presentations.
Financial bath activity was observed in this study 
for a one-year period extending from October, 1972, through 
September, 1973. The time period under study was neces­
sarily limited because of the task of manually accumulating 
the necessary data. Recent stock price data and informa­
tion regarding discretionary items are not available on the
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Compustat Tapes, thereby requiring a manual accumulation 
of the data. Nothing was discovered which would indicate 
that the period under study was unusual. The frequency 
rate of bath activity was reasonable when compared to 
other studies which were specifically designed to measure 
the frequency with which this activity occurs. However, 
it would be beneficial if the time period under study 
could be extended to cover several years.
It is strongly suggested that whenever a material 
discretionary loss is recognized in a company's current 
financial statements that management be required to iden- 
tify those events in the current period which were the 
cause of the diminution in company resources. Lacking a 
reasonable identification, an allocation and pro forma 
restatement of prior results would, in the view of this 
writer, serve to discourage financial bath activity.
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APPENDIX A 
NAMES OF SAMPLE COMPANIES
1. Addressograph Multigraph
2. Airco
3. American Bakeries
4. American Can
5. Andersen Clayton
6. Atlantic Richfield
7. Bangor Punta
8. Bluebird Incorporated
9. Boise Cascade
10. Celanese
11. Cerro
12. The Charter Company
13. Cities Service
14. Collins Radio
15. Combustion Engineering
16. Commonwealth Oil Refining
17. Continental Can
18. Crown Zellerbach
19. Dayco
20. Ex-Cel1-0
21. Fibreboard
22. Fleetwood Enterprises
23. FMC
24. General Dynamics
25. Genesco
26. Getty Oil
27. Gulf oil
28. Handy and Harman
29. Heinz H J
30. Heublein
31. Indian Head
32. Interstate Brands
33. Kaiser Steel
34. Kraftco
35. Lowenstein M and Sons
36. LTV
37. Magnavox
38. Mattel
39. McGraw-Hill
40. Mead
41. Murphy Oil
42. NCR
43. Ogden
44. Olin
45. Pennwalt
?06
46. Pet Incorporated
47. Questor
48. Revere Copper and Brass
49. Schlitz Brewing
50. Southwest Forest Industries
51. Squibb
52. Standard Oil (Ohio)
53. Stevens J. P.
54. Sunstrand
55. Sybron
56. Tally Industries
57. Time, Inc.
58. Ward Foods
59. Wheelabrator-Frye
60. Whittaker
APPENDIX B
TYPE OF INFORMATION GATHERED 
FOR EACH COMPANY
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